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ABSTRACT: City infrastructureis getting smarter. Embedded smart sensors
in roads, lampposts, and electrical grids offer the government a way to
regulate municipal resources and the police a new power to monitor citizens.
This structuralsensor surveillance, however, raises a difficult constitutional
question: Does the creation of continuously-recording, aggregated, long-term
data collection systems violate the Fourth Amendment? After all, recent
Supreme Court cases suggest that technologies that allow police to monitor
location, revealpersonalpatterns, and track personal detailsfor long periods
of time are Fourth Amendment searches which require a probable cause
warrant.
This Article uses the innovation of smart city structuraldesign as a way to
rethink current Fourth Amendment theory. This Article examines the Fourth
Amendment search questions that may render structural surveillance
unconstitutional, and then offers a legal and practicaldesign solution. The
Article argues that Fourth Amendment principles must be built into the
blueprints of urban design. At a micro-level, privacy rules must be embedded
alongside data collection rules. At a macro-level, a comprehensive legal
framework must be integrated with digital design choices. Only by thinking
about municipal code and computer code simultaneously can smart cities
avoid emerging FourthAmendment challenges.
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I.

INTRODUCTION

Sensors are now embedded in the infrastructure of American cities.
Smart roads, smart streetlights, smart homes, and smart electrical grids offer
entirely new means of monitoring citizens living in "smart cities."' This
municipal data collection involves state actors surveilling citizens, literally
tagging them, touching them, and tracking them-all the while aggregating
personal data for government purposes over long periods of time.
Unfortunately, and a bit awkwardly, these digital contacts collide with
Fourth Amendment "search"2 principles because the modern Fourth
Amendment turns on issues such as tracking, touch, aggregated personal data
collection, and "too permeating police surveillance."3 Physical intrusion,4
expectations of privacy,5 and a fear of arbitrary surveillance 6 rest at the core
of Fourth Amendment search cases.
This Article asks the question of what happens when the architecture of
a digital future is built on an analog Fourth Amendment framework. Are
smart city sensors unconstitutional because they inadvertently allow for
aggregated government collection of personal data without a probable-cause
search warrant? Will smart cities become Fourth Amendment-free zones with
ubiquitous tracking and no expectations of privacy? Or can design principles

1.

See, e.g., BEN GREEN, THE SMART ENOUGH CITY: PUTTING TECHNOLOGY IN ITS PLACE TO

RECLAIM OUR URBAN FUTURE 1-14 (2019).

2.

The Fourth Amendment provides that
[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants
shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be
seized.

U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
3.
Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2214 (2018) (quoting United States v. Di
Re, 332 U.S. 581, 595 (1948)); see id. at 2211-20.
4.
United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 404-05 (2012)
(finding that "[t]he
Government['s] physically occup[ying] private property for the purpose of obtaining
information" was a search for Fourth Amendment purposes).
5.
Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring) ("My
understanding of the rule that has emerged from prior decisions is that there is a twofold
requirement, first that a person have exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy and,
second, that the expectation be one that society is prepared to recognize as 'reasonable."').
6.
See United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 554 (1976) (articulating that the
purpose of the Fourth Amendment is to protect against "arbitrary and oppressive interference by
enforcement officials with the privacy and personal security of individuals").
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be created using smart sensor technology to respond to these Fourth
Amendment concerns?
The short answer is that under current Supreme Court doctrine,
automated, continuous, aggregated, long-term acquisition of personal data by
smart sensors triggers Fourth Amendment scrutiny and thus could violate the
Constitution.7 The longer answer recognizes the need for a new theory of how
the Fourth Amendment can fit the digital age as well as new design rules for
smart sensor technologies.8
This Article uses the innovation of smart sensor structural design as a way
to rethink current Fourth Amendment

doctrine. It argues that Fourth

Amendment principles must be built into the blueprints of urban planning.
At a micro-level, privacy rules must be embedded alongside data collection
rules. At a macro-level, a comprehensive legal framework must be integrated
with digital design choices. This is not a simple process because the
technologies vary in terms of scope, scale, connectivity, and purpose. But it is
important because the smart design rules developed today will shape the
privacy expectations of tomorrow.
Imagine what the smart sensor-enabled city of the future can do. It can
monitor where citizens walk, drive, live, play, eat, what medical services they
need, what they buy, what they like, who they visit and associate with, and who
they love.9 The city becomes the platform for data collection.- The data is
potentially available at a granular level to track individuals, at an associational
level to map networks of contacts, and at a pattern level to monitor the
number of people involved in any activity. This "sensorveillance" data is tied
to geography, time, and date, and can be visualized across days, weeks, or
years."
7.

See infra Part III (discussing the Fourth Amendment analysis of smart cities).

8.
See infra Part VI (detailing a digital positive law to address the shortcomings of existing
Fourth Amendment doctrine).
9.
See infra Part II (detailing the rise of smart city technology); Jan Whittington,
Remembering the Public in the Race to Become Smart Cities, 85 UMKC L. REV. 925, 927 (2017)
("Though the intended consequence of smart city technology may be efficiency, the unintended
consequence may be surveillance."); see alsoJanine S. Hiller & Jordan M. Blanke, Smart Cities, Big
Data, and the Resilience ofPrivacy, 68 HASTINGS L.J. 309, 314-15 (2017) (discussing the vast variety
and scope of "big data" collected in smart cities).
10.

Andrew Guthrie Ferguson, When Citizens Become the Product, PRAWFSBLAWG (Apr.

i1,

2018, 3:03 PM), https://prawfsblawg.blogs.com/prawfsblawg/2o18/04/when-citizens-becomethe-product.html [https://perma.cc/7CVH-D6SB] (describing the problem of selling public
data to private companies in exchange for public services and benefits).
ii.
I coined the term sensorveillance in The "Smart"Fourth Amendment. See Andrew Guthrie
Ferguson, The "Smart"FourthAmendment, 102 CORNELL L. REV. 547, 551 n.15 (2017) [hereinafter
Ferguson, "Smart" Fourth] ("The term 'sensorveillance' owes its inspiration to the term
'dataveillance."' (quoting M. Ryan Cale, People Can Be So Fake: A New Dimension to Privacy and
Technology Scholarship, 114 PENN. ST. L. REV. 80g, 822 (2010))); see alsoJustinJouvenal, Commit a
Crime? Your Fitbit, Key Fob or Pacemaker Could Snitch on You., WASH. POST (Oct. 9, 2017), https://
www.washingtonpost.com/local/public-safety/commit-a-crime-your-fitbit-key-fob-or-pacemakercould-snitch-on-you/2017/1o/o9/f3 5 a4f3o-8f 5o-11e7-8df 5 -c2e 5 cf4 6c1e2_story.html
[https://
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And then think about what police wish to do in the name of public safety.
Using data, police can monitor individuals thought to be involved in criminal
activities, associated groups involved in networks of crime, and places of
criminal risk. They can seek to understand points of environmental
vulnerability, victims most at risk, and patterns of crime.13 They can seek to
understand crime data in terms of geography, time, people, and patterns, and
visualize it across the days, weeks, or years.14 Using smart sensor technologies,
police will possess a powerful investigative "time machine."15 Crimes can be
investigated by rolling back the digital trails to see who might have been near
the scene, what they did, and how they acted. Police response time will
improve, witnesses will be found more quickly, and the raw material of
investigative clues will be memorialized in digital form. 6 Depending on the
level of granularity and the anonymity protections baked into the system, this
capability will change how police do their jobs and how citizens act.
Depending on how the sensors are configured, these city environments can
either create a Fourth Amendment search problem or avoid one.
Intriguingly, the flexibility of the technology may also hint at a solution
to the Fourth Amendment puzzle. Because the digital architecture must be
built from scratch, digital property rights and social expectations of privacy
can be written into code-both legal code and computer code. This moment
of physical and digital construction opens the possibility for a legal
reconstruction of privacy, potentially offering more protections, more
transparency, and more democratic engagement about the balance between

perma.cc/48JZ-C7N7]
Internet of Things).

(using the term sensorveillance to describe surveillance among the

12.
See generally Sarah Brayne, Big Data Surveillance: The Case of Policing, 82 AM. SOCIO. REV.
977 (2017) (analyzing the impact of big data analytics on the Los Angeles Police Department's
surveillance practices); Andrew Guthrie Ferguson, BigDataand PredictiveReasonableSuspicion, 163
U. PA. L. REV. 327 (2015) (analyzing the impact of big data policing on the Fourth Amendment
"reasonable suspicion" standard); Elizabeth E. Joh, Policing by Numbers: Big Data and the Fourth
Amendment, 89 WASH. L. REV. 35 (2014) (discussing the Fourth Amendment implications of
big data-driven predictive policing, mass surveillance systems, and DNA databanks); Andrew
D. Selbst, Disparate Impact in Big Data Policing, 52 GA. L. REV. 109 (2017) (discussing the
discriminatory effects of predictive policing and proposing the use of "algorithmic impact
statements" for early and transparent consideration of these effects); Ric Simmons, Quantifying
CriminalProcedure:How to Unlock the Potentialof Big Data in Our CriminalJusticeSystem, 2016 MICH.
ST. L. REV. 947 (suggesting strategies for fair and effective use of algorithms in predictive policing).
13.

See sources cited supra note 12.

14.

See sources cited supra note 12.

15.
Stephen E. Henderson, FourthAmendment Time Machines (and What They Might Say About
Police Body Cameras), 18 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 933, 937 (2016) (coining the "time machine"
metaphor in the Fourth Amendment context).
16.
See Sidney Fussell, Kentucky Is Turning to Drones to Fix Its Unsolved-MurderCrisis, ATLANTIC
(Nov. 6, 2o18), https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2o18/1 1 /police-drone-shotspotterkentucky-gun-g 1-ai/574723 [https://perma.cc/VgKT-LQJUI;Jouvenal, supranote in (describing
"how Internet-connected, data-collecting smart devices such as fitness trackers, digital home
assistants, thermostats, TVs and even pill bottles are beginning to transform criminal justice").

IOWA LAW REVIEW

52

[Vol. 10o6:47

security and liberty in urban spaces.17 In many ways, the design of smart
sensors in urban infrastructure offers an opportunity to redesign Fourth
Amendment protections by creating a digital positive law that can reshape
existing Fourth Amendment theory and also, where appropriate, forbid
certain privacy-invading practices.
Part II of this Article addresses the rise of structural surveillance in city
environments, examining how smart sensors are being embedded in the built
environment, regulating utilities, augmenting public safety, and connecting
denizens through a networked digital layer. The next three Parts examine

how the Fourth Amendment addresses this world of smart sensors. Part III
offers a new theory of Fourth Amendment privacy in public arising from
recent Supreme Court cases involving digital technologies, which collectively
establish what this Article calls a "digital reasonable expectation of privacy test
in public." These recent Supreme Court cases offer a fractured, but functional
new framework to address the different privacy issues arising from smart
sensor technologies in public. Part IV examines the recently rediscovered
Fourth Amendment "trespass" test as applied to smart city technologies. This
test supplements the reasonable expectation of privacy test and presents novel
problems in the context of smart infrastructure. Part V addresses possible
rejoinders to these arguments and possible exceptions to the Fourth
Amendment. Finally, Part VI suggests an alternative Fourth Amendment
theory tied to a quasi-positive law approach built around digital rights.
II.

STRUCTURAL SENSOR SURVEILLANCE

To speak of sensor surveillance is to speak of both present capabilities
and future plans. Smart sensors currently exist in streetlights, cars, and homes,
but entire industries are being designed to capitalize (monetarily and
technologically) on sensor-driven efficiencies in the built urban environment.s
A "smart sensor" is a generic term for a device that can take inputs from
the physical environment, collect data, and share it with other similarly
connected devices.19 For example, a smart pollution sensor might sample
water or air quality from the physical environment and convert it to a readable
score, and then share that information with a collecting sensor.20 Smart

17.

See infraPartVI (describing how to reimagine smart cities with more privacy protection).

SeeJoe Carmichael, Amazon PreviewsIts Autonomous Just Walk Out" Grocery Stores, INVERSE
(Dec. 5, 2016, 11:33 AM), https://www.inverse.com/article/2473o-amazon-go-grocery-shopping
[https://perma.cc/8PBD-YDLT]; Note, If These Walls Could Talk: The Smart Home and the Fourth
Amendment Limits of the Third Party Doctrine, 130 HARV. L. REV. 1924, 1924-25, 1939 (2017)
[hereinafter Walls]; Adam Thierer & Ryan Hagemann, Removing Roadblocks to Intelligent Vehicles
and Driverless Cars, 5 WAKE FOREST J.L. & POL'Y 339, 345 (2015).
1 g.
See Dalmacio V. Posadas, Jr., After the Gold Rush: The Boom of the Internet of Things, and the
18.

Busts ofData-Security and Privacy, 28 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 69, 75-77 (2017)

(describing the role of smart sensors in the Internet of Things).

20. See Kelly Kennedy, Note, 1 9 th Century Farming and 21st Century Technology: The Path to
Cleaner Water, 47 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1385, 14o8-og (2015) (discussing the use of sensors to monitor
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sensors tend to be small, low cost, wireless, energy efficient, and can be
combined with other devices and networked together.1 So, for example, a
single smart pollution sensor could be combined with thousands of other
sensors to offer a reading of air quality for an entire city.22 The network of
smart sensors allows physical devices to communicate with other sensors. The
result is the potential to track almost anything that can be reduced to its digital
signature.
These smart sensors promise a new form of "algorithmic governance"23
-to more efficiently provide scarce resources like electricity and water and to
monitor public safety or emergency situations.24 To work as planned, cities
must collect sensor data of all types of inputs, analyze it, record it, and act on
it as quickly as possible. The data sources can be built into the architecture
and infrastructure of the city buildings or streets. Sensors can be set to
automatically and continuously record and communicate with other sensors.
Of course, this data-driven governmental control comes at the expense of
traditional notions of privacy and a hands-off approach to government.25
The next Section examines structural surveillance capabilities focusing
on design choices that might be relevant to city planners or citizens thinking
about how to evaluate digital sensors in their cities.

water pollutants and environmental contamination); Skip Descant, California'sBay Area to Measure
Air Quality Block-by-Block, GOVT TECH. (Jan. 17, 2020), https://www.govtech.com/atialytics/
Californias-Bay-Area-to-Measure-Air-Quality-Block-by-Block.html
[https://perma.cc/LAQ7YNXG]; Solomon Serwanjja, Kenya Pollution:How Air Sensors Are Helping PeopleFight Pollution, BBC
NEWS (Dec. 5, 2og), https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-50647465 [https://perma.cc/
FVSC-MS 4 ].
4

21.

See, e.g., FED. TRADE COMM'N, INTERNET OF THINGS: PRIVACY & SECURITY INA CONNECTED

WORLD 5-6 (2015), https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/reports/federal-tradeconmnission-staff-report-november-2013-workshop-entitled-internet-things-privacy/ 150127iotrpt.pdf
[https://perma.cc/W8YD-SGAg].
22.
See Liesbet van Zoonen, Privacy Concerns in Smart Cities, 33 GOVT INFO.
(2016) (discussing pollution sensors in the city of Rotterdam).

Q.

472, 472

23.
Robert Brauneis & Ellen P. Goodman, Algorithmic Transparencyfor the Smart City, 20
YALE J.L. & TECH. 103, 114 (2018) ("Use of big data and predictive algorithms is a form of
governance-that is, a way for authorities to manage individual behavior and allocate resources.
Implementation of algorithms at the local level is part of a broader move towards data-driven
decision making, and must be understood in the context of the 'smart city' agenda." (footnote
omitted)).
24.
Hiller & Blanke, supra note g, at 311 ("Government agencies, quasi-governmental
utilities, commercial interests, and others will trace, analyze, and predict the movements, needs,
and scarcities of citizens in the city in order to manage resources and protect the community
most effectively."); Saraju P. Mohanty, Uma Choppali & Elias Kougianos, Everything You Wanted to
Know About Smart Cities: The Internet of Things Is the Backbone, IEEE CONSUMER ELECS. MAC., July
2016, at 60, 60 ("As a simplistic explanation, a smart city is a place where traditional networks
and services are made more flexible, efficient, and sustainable with the use of information, digital,
and telecommunication technologies to improve the city's operations for the benefit of its
inhabitants.").
25.
Hiller & Blanke, supra note g, at 312 ("The smart city's pervasive use of sensors and
citizen surveillance threatens to create a society that ignores boundaries for individual privacy.").
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SMART SENSOR DESIGN

Integrated smart sensors are shaped by choices in engineering and
design. Sensors can be localized or networked together. Data can be stored
and de-anonymized at the source, or aggregated in a centralized location. The
sensors can be place-based, person-based, thing-based, or all three. Each
design choice offers an important moment to restrict or expand the scope
and scale of data being collected by the government.
Such design choices can directly impact the usefulness of the data
collected. For example, a single sensor can identify how many automobiles
drive past a particular street. Data can be stored-or "siloed"-on the device
and collected monthly to determine traffic density at a particular place over
that specific time period. Or thousands of such sensors can be networked
together to provide a city-wide reading of traffic patterns.2 6 These sensors
again can be siloed or aggregated depending on how the data is collected. If
integration were the goal, each of the sensors could provide real-time outputs
of traffic patterns. The sensors could be placed in city infrastructure (e.g.,
curbs or streetlights), or on cars (i.e., license plates), or even captured by
video surveillance and digitally converted into traffic density readings. A
single sensor on a single street may not seem a significant privacy concern,
but a city-wide aggregated sensor system may suggest a new type of surveillance
capacity.
Choices also arise about the capacity to track individual objects within the
system. One could set up a traffic system to anonymize all the cars that pass
by, treating them as undifferentiated physical objects.27 Or one could provide
a unique identifier for each car, albeit not associated with a particular person
(like an IP address in the computer context). 2 Or one could identify a

26.
Whittington, supra note 9, at 928 ("Smart technologies offer the promise of real-time
data with remarkably thick flows of information.... Instead of traffic counts estimated from travel
diary surveys and the occasional placement of cables that record the numbers of cars as they roll
across each cable, traffic operations personnel can have the real-time traces of persons through
the road networks of the city, sent in continuous signals from their automobiles, phones, and
computers to networked Wi-Fi and Bluetooth sensors.").
27.
See Jonathan M. Gitlin, Concerned About Connected Car Privacy? Bluetooth Sensors Used to
Track Traffic, ARs TECHNICA (July 24, 2017, 10:20 AM), https://arstechnica.com/cars/2017/07/
a-danish-town-has-been-using-bluetooth-sensors-to-track-traffic-patterns
[https://perma.cc/
9 6MF-YTXC] (describing the process behind Bluetooth tracking of real-time traffic patterns);
OTONOMO, A PRIVACY PLAYBOOK FOR CONNECTED CAR DATA 15-16 (2o19), https://fpf.org/

[https://perma.cc/7MRV-F
wp-content/uploads/2o2o/o1/OtonomoPrivacyPaper.pdf
(explaining how car data can be used while still retaining privacy).

5

2D]

28.
See Klaus Philipsen, How Will Technology Change Cities ?, 7 U. BALT.J. LAND & DEV. 91, 94
-95 (2o18) ("Traffic signals can be equipped with sensors as well to coordinate traffic with
sophisticated programs which respond to volume not only at one intersection, but within an
entire network of roads and could successfully optimize traffic flow and even differentiate
between cars and transit."). But seeJohn R. Quain, Cars Suck up DataAbout You. Where Does It All
Go?, N.Y. TIMES (July 27, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/07/27/automobiles/wheels/
car-data-tracking.html [https://perma.cc/ZFY6-R7GR] (noting that "radar sensors, diagnostic
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particular car allowing for a tracking capacity that might be useful for toll
collection, mileage taxes, or parking enforcement tied to individual driving
use.29 Those collection mechanisms could also remain siloed and isolated, or
aggregated and trackable. The result, again, turns on how the system is
designed at the outset.
As a simplified example of the future challenges with smart sensor
design, the following are possible uses of smart sensor technology, focusing
on the overlapping categories of (1) the built environment (infrastructure);
(2) utilities (services); (3) public safety (security); and (4) a city-wide
networked digital interface (application program interface) that has the
potential to connect all of the above.
1.

Built Environment

Traditional cities are built with concrete, steel, asphalt, and glass. Yet
smart cities can reimagine this physical reality as a data collection system by
placing digital sensors within the built environment.so These sensors will
continually collect data about physical structures, residents, and the natural
world in order to more efficiently provide basic government services and
monitor civic activity.
Longstanding urban fixtures like streetlights, curbs, smart signs, and
sidewalks are being equipped with sensors or visual tracking technologies to
count the number of cars or people who pass by.31 This information can
be very helpful to ease traffic congestion, including providing real-time
information on blocked traffic lanes2 or dangerous potholes.33 Sensors can

systems, in-dash navigation systems and built-in cellular connections" in cars can record sensitive
data, and "[t] he United States generally does not ensure that companies strip out names or other
personal details [from that data]").
29.
SeeJames Doubek, Digital License Plates Roll Out in Calfornia, NPR (June 1, 2o18, 8:14
AM), https://www.ripr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2oi8/o6/oi/616043976/digital-license-platesroll-out-in-california [https://perma.cc/3P 4 V-X78S].
30.
Mohanty et al., supra note 24, at 62 ("The infrastructure of the smart city includes
physical aspects, ICT [information communication technology], and services. The physical
infrastructure is the real physical or structural entity of the smart city, including buildings, roads,
railway tracks, power supply lines, and water supply system.").
31.

MIKE

BARLOW

&

CORNEALIA

LEVY-BENCHETON,

SMART

CITIES,

SMART

FUTURE:

SHOWCASING TOMORROW 51-72 (2o18).
32. Jesse W. Woo, Smart Cities Pose Privacy Risks and Other Problems, but that Doesn't Mean We
Shouldn't Build Them, 85 UMKC L. REV. 953, 955 (2017) ("[I]n Kansas City, Sensity's LED
streetlights . . . have visual sensors that can track when a vehicle is blocking the path of the new
streetcar and alert authorities to have it ticketed and removed.").
Mickey McCarter, Smart Cities Connect 2018: Cameras, Sensors Turn City Vehicles into Smart
33.
Assets, STATETECH (Mar. 28, 2018), https://statetechmagazine.com/article/2o18/03/smartcities-connect-2o18-cameras-sensors-turn-city-vehicles-smart-assets
[https://perma.cc/2SBN2WAG] (showing how city vehicle "data can be used to identify potholes, locate damaged traffic
signs, and discover other problems").
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also ease toll collection and parking enforcement.34 For instance, Santander,
Spain installed 12,000 sensors under the streets or on street lamps to assist
with parking and save electricity.35 Santander residents can use smartphone
apps to find open parking spots, road closures, and learn about other city
services.36
Smart cars will not only be able to drive themselves, but will also be able
to provide real time information about paths and patterns of the automobiles
around them.37 Car services like Lyft or Uber already provide the same type
of informational awareness for those in the sharing economy, mapping not
only their routes but the entire city's traffic patterns.38 Bike and scooter
services similarly reveal local community travel habits.39 These transportation
technologies do notjust offer convenience and flexibility, but volumes of data
about travel patterns, preferences, and urban space all collected by smart
sensors. Similarly, smart subway cards, bus passes, and road tolls provide
measurable data on the number of people using public transport or roads at
any given time and across all time.40

Bryce Clayton Newell, Local Law EnforcementJumps on the Big Data Bandwagon:Automated
34.
License Plate Recognition Systems, Information Privacy, and Access to Government Information, 66 ME. L.
REV. 397, 404-10 (2014) (describing states' use of Automated License Plate Readers ("ALPR")
for law enforcement and toll revenue collection).
35.
36.

Hiller & Blanke, supra note 9, at 317-18.
Id.

37.
See Alexander B. Lemann, Coercive Insurance and the Soul of Tort Law, io5 GEO. L.J. 55,
(2016) ("[A modern telematics device] collects data for wireless transmission to an insurance
company, including how fast your car is moving, when, for how long, and in some cases where
you drive, and the g-forces your car experiences as it accelerates, brakes, or maneuvers around
turns.").

56

38.
Hemant Bhargava, David S. Evans & Deepa Mani, The Move to Smart Mobile Platforms:
Implications for Antitrust Analysis of Online Markets in Developed and Developing Countries, 16 U.C.
DAVIS Bus. L.J. 157, 164 (2016) ("[R]ide sharing services such as Uber use large amounts of
historical data (such as traffic patterns and sharing patterns) as well as real-time data (such as
traffic conditions and the location and preferences of riders) as the fuel for intelligent
algorithmic search and optimization programs that produce ride-sharing allocations in realtime."); Matt McFarland, Uber and Lyft Battle Los Angeles over the Future of Transportation, CNN
Bus. (May 23, 2019, 9:58 AM), https://www.cnn.com/20i9/05/23/tech/uber-lyft-cities-data/
index.html [https://perma.cc/D28Q-G6DB].
39.
See Benjamin Schneider, Why Little Vehicles Will Conqueror the City, BLOOMBERG CITYLAB
(June 21, 2018, 2:18 PM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2o18-06-21/a-guide-tolittle-vehicles-the-future-of-urban-mobility [https://perma.cc/3EKZ-A9 5 U]; David Zipper, Cities
Can See Where You're Taking that Scooter, SLATE (Apr. 2, 2019, 5:45 AM), https://slate.com/
business/o19/04/scooter-data-cities-mds-uber-lyft-los-angeles.html
[https://perma.cc/68PYD28H].
40.
Colin Harrison & Ian Abbott Donnelly, A Theory of Smart Cities, PROC. 55TH ANN.
MEETING INT'L SOCY SYs. SCIs.,July 2011, at 1, 3 ("A road tolling system, for example, provides
large amounts of precise, 'real-time' information about the movement of vehicles through toll
gates. Offline analysis of historical traffic data can find patterns that can be leading indicators of
the risk of congestion occurring in specific city districts. When such patterns are then found in
'real-time' data, they provide a warning period that enables managers to adjust the traffic
management system to prevent such congestion occurring."); see also Kelsey Finch & Omer
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Built along smart roads, smart homes and apartments will be filled with
communication-enabled devices. Living in those homes will be people with all
sorts of smart, data-generating gadgets. Even in a non-smart city, digital
natives leave a revealing data trail of their habits. Personal patterns are
exposed by smart alarm systems, ovens, coffee makers, toothbrushes, and
Amazon Echo commands that track daily life.41 Wi-Fi-enabled computers and
tablets reveal times at work and time off for play, along with Internet queries,
news preferences, and entertainment choices.42 Biometric devices reveal our
health and exercise habits.43 Internet Service Providers ("ISPs") track every
search we make and every show we watch.44 Smart security services monitor
our homes and report on suspicious people.45 New consumer-friendly
products like video-enabled Ring doorbells offer "surveillance as a service"
that can turn a home into a networked neighborhood security network.4 6
Simply put, our structural physical environment is digitally exposed like never
before-an attractive target for smart city designers seeking to sell smart
apartments, and smarter lifestyles.

Tene, Welcome to the Metropticon: Protecting Privacy in a Hyperconnected Town, 41 FORDHAM URB.
L.J. 1581, 1586 (2014) ("Electronic toll collection systems have become the norm in both urban
and non-urban spaces, using RFID tags and video cameras so that drivers can prepay tolls,
eliminating the need to stop at toll plazas.").
41.
See Scott R Peppet, Regulating the Internet of Things: First Steps Toward Managing
Discrimination, Privacy, Security, and Consent, 93 TEX. L. REV. 85, 88-go, 101, 135 (2014); see also
id. at i20 ("The technical problem created by the Internet of Things is that sensor data tend to
combine in unexpected ways, giving rise to powerful inferences from seemingly innocuous data
sources. Put simply, in a world of connected sensors, 'everything may reveal everything.' Sensor
data are so rich, accurate, and fine-grained that data from any given sensor context may be
valuable in a variety of-and perhaps all-other economic or information contexts.").
SeeJohn Herrman, Google Knows Where You've Been, but Does It Know Who You Are?, N.Y.
42.
TIMES MAG. (Sept. 12, 2018), https://www.rtytimes.com/2o18/og/12/magazine/google-mapslocation-data-privacy.html [https://perma.cc/TPB6-L3XZ].
43.
Parmy Olson, Wearable Tech Is Plugginginto Health Insurance, FORBES (June 19, 2014, 1:26
PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/parmyolson/2014/06/ig/wearable-tech-health-insurance

[https://perma.cc/M828-VFPNI.
44.
See, e.g., Paul Ohm, The Rise andFallofInvasive ISPSurveillance, 2009 U. ILL. L. REV. 1417,
1420, 1437-39; Christopher S. Yoo, ProtocolLayering and InternetPolicy, 161 U. PA. L. REV. 1707,
1769 (2013).
45.
Krystal Rogers-Nelson, Robotic Monitoring and AI-Powered Surveillance Are Changing Home
Security, VENTUREBEAT (Oct. 12, 2017, 2:1o PM), https://vetturebeat.com/2o17/to/12/
robotic-monitoring-and-ai-powered-surveillance-are-changing-home-security [https://perma.cc/
UTAg-AFBS].
46.
Alison Griswold, Amazon Wants to Sell "Surveillanceas a Service, "QUARTZ (June 20, 2019),
https://qz.com/1648875/amazon-receives-us-patent-for-surveillance-as-a-service
[https://
perma.cc/2MKE-VV3N]; Amazon's Ring Doorbell Camera Is Pretty Much the Trojan Horse of Home
Privacy, MARKETPLACE TECH (Nov. 22, 2019), https://www.marketplace.org/shows/marketplacetech/amazons-ring-doorbell-camera-is-pretty-much-the-trojan-horse-of-home-privacy
[https://
perma.cc/BXT8-BX3M]; Drew Harwell, Doorbell-CameraFirm Ring Has Partnered with 400 Police
Forces, Extending Surveillance Concerns, WASH. POST (Aug. 28, 2019, 5:53 PM), https://
www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2oi9/08/28/doorbell-camera-firm-ring-has-partneredwith-police-forces-extending-surveillance-reach [https://perma.cc/L 3 W 4 -GCRA].
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Utilities

In smart cities, finite resources like water, electricity, and gas can be
regulated through sensor data. For example, cities are looking into smart
energy grids to predict the fluctuating level of energy consumption at
different times of the year (or even times of day).47 Regulating water use,
waste, and other necessary services can be managed more responsibly with
better data. For example, instead of having streetlights that stay on all night,
smart streetlights might only turn on in response to the presence of a person
or vehicle.4 8 Or, instead of having a weekly trash day, trash receptacles might

automatically alert the need for disposal, and trash trucks would find the most
optimal routes for pick-up.49 The city-state of Singapore, for example, has
experimented with sensors to track energy usage and personal waste.50
Songdo, South Korea, an urban center inspired by smart cities, uses a vast
camera system to monitor traffic and crimesl and even has "[a] citywide

47.
See Finch & Tene, supranote 40, at 1588 ("One of the most visible 'smart' infrastructure
systems today is the smart grid, which allows utilities, users, and other third parties to monitor
and control electricity use."). See generally ANN CAVOUKIAN & JULES POLONETSKY, PRIVACY BY
DESIGN AND THIRD PARTY ACCESS TO CUSTOMER ENERGY USAGE DATA (Jan. 2013) [hereinafter
CAVOUKIAN & POLONETSKY, THIRD PARTY ACCESS], https://www.ipc.ori.ca/wp-content/uploads/

Resources/pbd-thirdparty-CEUD.pdf [https://perma.cc/LD 5 8-KHR3] (discussing third-party
aggregation of customer energy information and related privacy issues); INFO. & PRIV. COMM'R
OF ONT., PRIVACY BY DESIGN: ACHIEVING THE GOLD STANDARD IN DATA PROTECTION FOR THE
SMART GRID (2010)

[hereinafter INFO. & PRIV. COMM'R OF ONT., GOLD STANDARD], https://

www.smartgrid.gov/document/privacy_design_achievitig_gold_statidard_data_protection_sma
rtgrid [https://perma.cc/REW5-QRWX] (discussing the development of Ontario's Smart Grid
and related privacy issues).
48.
See Luis Gomez, Thousands of San Diego Street Lights Are Equipped with Sensors and
Cameras. Here's What They Record, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB. (Mar. 18, 2019, 5:20 PM), https://
www.satidiegoutiotitributie.com/opinion/the-conversation/sd-san-diego-street-light-sensorshow-they-work-2o19O318-htmlstory.html [https://perma.cc/ZM8-XAX8].
49.
Nathalie Vergoulias, Smart Cities: Is Cutting-Edge Technology the Method to Achieving Global
Sustainable Goals?, 32 J. ENV'T L. & LITIG. 271, 283 (2017) ("Sensors utilize radio frequency and
Wi-Fi, which provides data to a central system that advises sanitation workers of the trash level to
then prepare an optimal trash removal route."); see also Patience Haggin, How a Smart' Trash
Bin Can Transform City Garbage Collection, WALL ST. J. (May 21, 2019, 11:26 AM), https://
www.wsj.com/articles/how-a-smart-trash-bin-can-traisform-city-garbage-collection-1 11558452400
[https://perma.cc/2 4 LZ-2LHS] ("Tests conducted by the [smart trash] bin makers and several
city waste departments have shown that emptying trash containers before they are full tends to
make collecting waste much more efficient."); Colin Campbell, Notice New Smart' Trash Cans in
South Baltimore? They're Partof a Citywide Upgrade, BALT. SUN (Sept. 18, 2o18, 2:35 PM), https://
www.baltimoresuti.com/marylatid/baltimore-city/bs-md-ci-smart-trash-cans-2o 18og 18-story.html
(discussing Baltimore's first smart trash cans).
5o.
Nick Summers, Inside Google's Plan to Build a Smart Neighborhood in Toronto, ENGADGET
(Mar. 16, 2o18), https://www.erigadget.com/2o218/03/16/alphabet-google-sidewalk-labs-torontoquayside [https://perma.cc/QFB8-YC7 4 ].
51.
See Ross Arbes & Charles Bethea, Songdo, South Korea: City of theFuture?, ATLANTIC (Sept.
27, 2014), http://www.theatlatitic.com/international/archive/2o1 4 /09/soigdo-south-koreathe-city-of-the-future/38o8 4 9 [https://perma.cc/ 4 4 EG-UC98].
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pneumatic refuse system [that] sucks garbage below the surface and into a
remote sorting center, eliminating the need for dirty garbage trucks."52
Environmental data can also be collected, monitoring air quality,
pollution, and even the perceived "happiness" of a particular community. "In
the Dutch city of Rotterdam, ... the regional environment agency produces
hourly data about air quality from sensors across greater Rotterdam resulting
in over 175,000 observations per year."53 In Chicago, the city government
rolled out an "'Array of Things' network ...
already labeled Your Big
(Friendly) Brother,' . . . consist[ing] of 'highly visible, aesthetically pleasing,
one-foot-square boxes mounted on light poles that track environmental
conditions around them."'"4 In London, a virtual city dashboard displays city
traffic cameras.55 Collected, this type of sensor data can allow cities to better
use resources and respond to quality-of-life problems. Because the networked
data can be centrally analyzed and acted upon in close to real time,5 6 it can
help city planners design a more inclusive, efficient, and livable city.57 But, of
course, it also traps citizens who cannot escape the digital collection all
around them.58 After all, it is almost impossible to opt out of basic services like
electrical services or trash collection.

52.

Summers, supra note

50.

van Zoonen, supra note 22, at 472.
53.
54.
Finch & Tene, supra note 40, at 1589-go (quoting Susan Crawford, Chicago Is Your Big
(Friendly)Brother, BLOOMBERG (June 19, 2014, 2: 4 8 PM), https://www.bloomberg.com/opiriiori/
articles/2o14-o6-1g/chicago-is-your-big-friendly-brother [https://perma.cc/2KYY-ZVJ 7 ]).
See London, CITYDASHBOARD, http://citydashboard.org/londoi
55.
LgQQ-Y6Y2].

[https://perma.cc/

56.
See Rob Kitchin, The Real-Time City? Big Data and Smart Urbanism, 79 GEOJOURNAL 1, 5
-6 (2014) ("For example, the Centro De Operacoes Prefeitura Do Rio in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil,
a partnership between the city government and IBM, have created a citywide instrumented system
that draws together data streams from thirty agencies, including traffic and public transport,
municipal and utility services, emergency services, weather feeds, and information sent in by
employees and the public via phone, internet and radio, into a single data analytics centre."
(citations omitted)).

57. See Mohanty et al., supra note 24, at 63 ("[I]n the context of smart cities, anything
physical, electrical, and digital that is the backbone of the smart city can be considered as its
infrastructure. There are many examples, including a rapid transit system, waste management
system, road network, railway network, communication system, traffic light system, street light
system, office space, water supply system, gas supply system, power supply system, firefighting
system, hospital system, bridges, apartment homes, hotels, digital library, law enforcement, and
economy system.").

58. See Finch & Terie, supra note 40, at 1596 ("Cities will have only one smart grid, one
subway system, and one set of emergency services available to the public. Public services have
captive populations who cannot opt out of information collection without paying a steep price in
safety, convenience, and quality of life.").
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Public Safety

Smart cities are surveillance cities with powerful capabilities to track,
predict, and record potential criminal actions or civil disorder.59 Many urban
cities already have adopted powerful visual surveillance technologies involving
digital camera systems. The Domain Awareness System in lower Manhattan
links more than 9,ooo cameras to a centralized command center where police
can observe the streets in real time. 60 The cameras record the public space
and store the data for a month.61 The existing system includes automated
alerts for suspicious behaviors (e.g., abandoning a bag) and the capacity to
search for a particular object in the footage (e.g., a sports logo or particular
colored shirt).62 The Chicago Police Department invested in a network of over
30,000 digital cameras, all recording high-risk neighborhoods. 63 Hartford,
Connecticut installed a series of artificially intelligent digital cameras that
allow police to run object recognition software to identify cars, license plates,
and suspicious activities. 64 Detroit, Michigan also has a similar camera system

59.
Whittington, supra note 9, at 927; Kitchin, supranote 56, at i1 ("It is now possible to
track and trace individuals and their actions, interactions and transactions in minute detail across
a number of domains (work, travel, consumption, etc.). This level of monitoring has been driven
by a growing 'culture of control' that desires 'security, orderliness, risk management and the
taming of chance."'). For an international perspective, see Simon Denyer, China's Watchful Eye:
Beijing Bets on FacialRecognition in a Big Drivefor Total Surveillance, WASH. POST (Jan. 7, 2018),
https://www.washirigtoripost.com/riews/world/wp/ 20 i 8/o 1 /07/feature /in-china-facialrecognition-is-sharp-end-of-a-drive-for-total-surveillance [https://perma.cc/TWL6-YRQ6]; Chinese
Man Caught by Facial Recognition at Pop Concert, BBC NEWS (Apr. 13, 2018), https://
www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-43751276
[https://perma.cc/ 4 6JF-B 5 SH]; Paul Mozur,
Inside China's Dystopian Dreams: A.L, Shame and Lots of Cameras, N.Y. TIMES (July 8, 2018),
https://www.tiytimes.com/2oi8/07/o8/business/china-surveillance-techiology.html [https://
perma.cc/ABJ-8DT 4 ]) ("China has an estimated 2oo million surveillance cameras...."); and
Lily Hay Newman, FacialRecognition Tech Is Creepy When It Works-and Creepier When It Doesn't,
WIRED (May 9, 2018, 2:51 PM), https://www.wired.com/story/facial-recognition-tech-creepyworks-or-not [https://perma.cc/6VBN-J2CZ].
6o.
See Thomas H. Davenport, How Big Data Is Helping the NYPD Solve Crimes Faster, FORTUNE
(July 17, 2oi6, 9:oo AM), http://fortuie.com/2o16/07/17/big-data-nypd-situational-awareness

[https://perma.cc/TgPW-W2KNI.
61.
See TalkPolitix, New York City-Domain Awareness, YOUTUBE (June 7, 2013),
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ozUHOHAAhzg [https://perma.cc/63YH-NX7J] (posting
an excerpt from NOVA, Manhunt-Boston Bombers, PUB. BROAD. SERV. (May 29, 2013)).
62.

Id.

63.
See Timothy Williams, Can 30,000 CamerasHelp Solve Chicago's Crime Problem?, N.Y. TIMES
(May 26, 2018), https://www.tiytimes.com/2o18/o5/26/us/chicago-police-surveillaice.html

[https://perma.cc/8GSA-2VWS].
64.
See Feoin Higgins, Pre-CrimePolicingIs Closer than You Think, and It's Freaking People Out,
VICE (June 12, 2018, 2:47 PM), https://www.vice.com/en_us/article/7xmmvy/why-doeshartford-have-so-many-cameras-precrime [https://perma.cc/gAHC-F 3 5 Z]; Milestone Systems,
HartfordCrime CenterExpands Surveillance, YOUTUBE (Dec. 12, 2017), https://www.youtube.com/
watch?v=OlGxTITe6dE [https://perma.cc/7F8W-T6DW].
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with facial recognition capabilities.65 Some cities have even piloted smart
cameras with automated alert systems that instantaneously deploy a police
response based on algorithmic suspicion of criminal activity. 66
In addition to fixed surveillance video, cities have begun incorporating
police-worn body camera footage and patrol car footage, and are considering
drones with video and video analytics capabilities. 6 7 As digital cameras become
cheaper and as machine learning technologies are embedded in video feeds,
the ability to track, identify, and monitor the streets will become allencompassing. 68
American police forces have partnered with private companies to offer
facial recognition technology on a pilot basis. 6 9 More tellingly, the companies
themselves have begun investing heavily in developing facial recognition and

65.
Amy Harmon, As Cameras Track Detroit's Residents, a Debate Ensues over Racial Bias, N.Y.
TIMES (July 8, 2019), https://www.tiytimes.com/2019/07/o8/us/detroit-facial-recognitioncameras.html [https://perma.cc/Q2UG-Y 7 2F] ("Facial recognition, the Detroit police stress, has
indeed helped lead to arrests. In late May, for instance, officers ran a video image through facial
recognition after survivors of a shooting directed police officers to a gas station equipped with
Green Light cameras where they had met with a man now charged with three counts of firstdegree murder and two counts of assault. The lead generated by the software matched
the description provided by the witnesses."); see also Jon Schuppe, How Facial Recognition
Became a Routine Policing Tool in America, NBC NEWS (May 11, 2019, 3:19 AM), https://
www.ibciews.com/news/us-news/how-facial-recognition-became-routine-policing-tool-american11004251 [https://perma.cc/APK-NFNA] (discussing the role of facial recognition software in
law enforcement).
66.
Michael L. Rich, Machine Learning, Automated Suspicion Algorithms, and the Fourth
Amendment, 164 U. PA. L. REV. 871, 876-79 (2016); AOL, Digisensory Technologies Avista Smart
Sensors, YOUTUBE (Sept. 14, 2012), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JamGobiS5wg [https://
perma.cc/X7 5 C-UE2L]; NJ City Leading Way in Crime-Fighting Tech, CBS NEWS (June 19, 2010,
9:30 AM), https://www.cbsiews.com/news/nj-city-leading-way-in-crime-fighting-tech [https://
perma.cc/M 4 FG-JEW 9 ].
67.
Fussell, supranote 16; Chaim Gartenberg, DJIIs Partneringwith Axon to Sell Video-Capable
Drones Directly to Cops, VERGE (June 5, 2018, 2:13 PM), https://www.theverge.com/2o18/
6/5/174299o8/dji-axon-air-taser-drones-police-officers-program-sale
[https://perma.cc/TE58HR 5 C].
68.
See Finch & Tene, supra note 40, at 16o1 ("Face and object detectors are already widely
deployed throughout urban landscapes, both as safety measures (the police in lower Manhattan
can track cars and people moving south of Canal Street and even detect unattended packages)
and as energy conservation tools (motion sensors on smart streetlights can save an additional
twenty to thirty percent on energy by dimming lights during hours of low activity, as well as
tracking noise and pollution levels)." (footnote omitted)).
69.
See Clare Garvie, GarbageIn, Garbage Out: Face Recognition on Flawed Data, GEO. L. CTR.
ON PRIV. & TECH. (May 16, 2o19), https://www.flawedfacedata.com [https://perma.cc/S98HPEES]; Drew Harwell, Oregon Became a Testing Ground for Amazon's Facial-Recognition Policing.
But What if Rekognition Gets It Wrong?, WASH. POST (Apr. 30, 2019, 5:19 PM), https://
www.washiigtoipost.com/techriology/2019/04/3o/amazons-facial-recognition-technology-issupercharging-local-police/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.1ob8818b 5 bea
[https://perma.cc/
6R6A-8SGU].
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object recognition capabilities.70 Companies are selling Al facial recognition
technology to schools in an effort to promote safety and to airports
for transportation security.71 Once improved beyond existing technical
limitations, cameras will be able to identify people, cars, objects, things, and
kinetic movements.7 2 The ubiquity of Automated License Plate Readers
("ALPRs"), which collect millions of recorded license plate images every day,
demonstrates the scale at which this type of digital recognition surveillance
can grow. 73
Video surveillance is but one of the capabilities that can be built into the
monitoring capacities of a smart city.74 Most obviously, in a wired city marked
by digital connecting points, police will be able to track the digital trails of the
people using city services or merely just passing by. As Jesse Woo writes, "[i]f
smart city sensors are deployed in public areas (which is kind of the point),
they potentially introduce government surveillance technology into the
public square at an unprecedented level."75
Sensor evidence from the Internet of Things has already started to
find its way into criminal cases.7 6 Cell-site locational data, internet browser
searches, and smartphone data offer circumstantial evidence of guilt.77 Smart

70.
See Sidney Fussell, The New Tech that Could Turn PoliceBody Cams into NightmareSurveillance
Tools, GIzMODO (Mar. 9, 2017, io:og AM), https://gizmodo.com/new-ai-could-turpolice-bodycams-into-nightmare-surve-1792224538 [https://perma.cc/8LSD-QHgA].
71.
Drew Harwell, Unproven Facial-Recognition Companies Target Schools, Promising an End to
Shootings, WASH. POST (June 7, 2018, 7:26 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/
economy/unproven-facial-recognition-companies-targetschools-promising-an-end-to-shootings/
2o18/06/07/iege6d 5 2-68db-11e8-ge38-24e693b38637_story.html [https://perma.cc/gMTUA 9 U6]; Lori Aratani, Your Face is Your Boarding Pass at This Airport, WASH. POST (Dec. 4, 2o18,
1:25 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/nation/2oi8/12/04/your-face-is-your-boardingpass-this-airport [https://perma.cc/KR 4 R-K6PS] ("Ai increasing number of airports are using
biometrics to process passengers as they move through the system. Dulles International Airport
recently unveiled a system that uses iPads to scan passengers' faces before they board flights. U.S.
Customs and Border Protection has been using biometrics to track passengers entering the U.S.").
72.

JAY STANLEY, ACLU, THE DAWN OF ROBOT SURVEILLANCE: AI, VIDEO ANALYTICS, AND

PRIVACY 17-21 (2019), https://www.aclu.org/sites/default/files/fielddocument/o6181grobotsurveillance.pdf [https://perma.cc/G2WG-DEFL].
See Randy L. Dryer & S. Shane Stroud, Automatic License Plate Readers:An Effective Law
73.
Enforcement Tool or Big Brother'sLatest Instrument of Mass Surveillance? Some Suggestionsfor Legislative
Action, 55JURIMETRICS 225, 234-35 (2015).
&

JOHN S. HOLLYWOOD, MICHAEL J.D. VERMEER, DULANI WOODS, SEAN E. GOODISON
74.
BRIAN A. JACKSON, USING VIDEO ANALYTICS AND SENSOR FUSION IN LAW ENFORCEMENT 4 (RAND

Corp. 2o18); STANLEY, supra note 72, at 37-38.
75.
76.

Woo, supranote 32, at 956.
Jouvenal, supranote i 1 (detailing biometric evidence used in criminal investigations).

77. Jennifer Valentino-DeVries, Tracking Phones, Google Is a Dragnetfor the Police, N.Y. TIMES
(Apr. 13, 2o1g), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2019/04/13/us/google-locationtracking-police.html
[https://perma.cc/4SR7-K93S]; Jennifer Valentino-DeVries, Natasha
Singer, Michael H. Keller & Aaron Krolik, Your Apps Know Where You Were Last Night, and They're
Not Keeping It Secret, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 1o, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/
2o18/12/ io/business/location-data-privacy-apps.html [https://perma.cc/ 4 WAK-HYD] (noting

2020o]

STRUCTURAL SENSOR SURVEILLANCE

63g

cars literally report individuals suspected of crimes.78 Algorithmic financial
systems report potential fraud.79 Finally, digital tools like Stingray
(International Mobile Subscriber Identity catchers) can find a particular cell
phone signal in a particular location and, if configured correctly, even
intercept some of the content in the transmission.'- As cities, homes, cars, and
people become more connected, the Internet of Things eventually will
become the "Internet of Evidence."1

Other criminal patterns will emerge from mass surveillance technologies
embedded in smart city sensors. Sometimes the evidence will be generalized,
like the ability of wastewater systems to identify an increase in illegal narcotics
from the sewage system.2 Other times it will be more individualized, like the
ability of smart electrical meters to identify suspiciously high home electricity
usage (consistent with growing marijuana).S3 And other times it will be
accidental, like the consequences of installing smart streetlights with audio

that many apps collect users' location data); Deanna Paul, Google Refused an Order to Release Huge
Amounts ofData. Will Other Companies Bow UnderPressure?, WASH. POST (Aug. 18, 2o18, 9:23 AM),
https://www.washirigtoripost.com/techriology/ 2o 18/o8/i8 /google-refused-an-order-releasehuge-amounts-data-will-other-companies-bow-under-pressure
[https://perma.cc/C8A 9 -H 3 6N]
(describing how Google searches are being used in criminal prosecutions to reveal location and
other incriminating clues).
78.
See Alex Hern, FloridaWoman Arrestedfor Hit-and-Run After Her CarCalls Police, GUARDIAN
(Dec. 7, 2015, 10:33 AM), http://www.theguardiari.com/technology/201 5 /dec/07/floridawoman-arrested-hit-and-run-car-calls-police [https://perma.cc/MH8U-LF7Z].
79.
See Cary Coglianese & David Lehr, Regulating by Robot: Administrative Decision Making in
the Machine-Learning Era, 105 GEO. L.J. 1147, 1164 (2017) ("[A]cademic researchers have
demonstrated how machine-learning algorithms can be used to predict cases of financial
statement fraud .... " (citing Johan Perols, Financial Statement Fraud Detection: An Analysis of
Statistical andMachine LearningAlgorithms, 30 AUDITING 19 (2011))).
8o.
Bert-Jaap Koops, Bryce Clayton Newell & Ivan Skorvanek, Location Tracking by Police: The
Regulation of 'Tireless and Absolute Surveillance,' 9 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 635, 669-70 (2019);
Stephanie K. Pell & Christopher Soghoian, A Lot More than a Pen Register, and Less than a Wiretap:
What the StingRay Teaches Us About How Congress Should Approach the Reform of Law Enforcement
Surveillance Authorities, 16YALEJ.L. & TECH. 134, 146 (2013); see alsoJustin Fenton, BaltimorePolice
Used Secret Technology to Track Cellphones in Thousands of Cases, BALT. SUN (Apr. 9, 2015), https://
www.baltimoresun.com/maryland/baltimore-city/bs-md-ci-stingray-case-20 15o4o8-story.html
(discussing the use of nondisclosure agreements between the FBI and police departments
regarding stingray operations); Brad Heath, Police Secretly Track Cellphones to Solve Routine Crimes,
USA TODAY (Aug. 24, 2015, 7:51 AM), https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/2015/o8/
23/baltimore-police-stingray-cell-surveillance/31994181 [https://perma.cc/8EV3-MH8W] ("In
one case after another, ... police in Baltimore and other cities used the phone tracker, commonly
known as a stingray, to locate the perpetrators of routine street crimes and frequently concealed
that fact from the suspects, their lawyers and even judges. In the process, they quietly transformed
a form of surveillance billed as a tool to hunt terrorists and kidnappers into a staple of everyday
policing.").
81.

Also the title of a future law review article I really should write.

82.
Christopher L. Hering, Note, Flushing the Fourth Amendment Down the Toilet: How
Community UrinalysisThreatens IndividualPrivacy, 5i ARIZ. L. REV. 741, 741-44 (2009).
83.

Naperville Smart Meter Awareness v. City of Naperville, goo F.3 d 521, 526 ( 7 th Cir. 2018).
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sensor capabilities that will be able to record gunshots and (inadvertently)
record human conversations.8 4
Beyond people and patterns, police can also target particular areas to
find all the people who might frequent a known drug house, intersection, or
gang territory.8 5 Cell data, wireless data, Bluetooth, and even Radio-Frequency
Identification ("RFID") sensors might all be designed to reveal locational data
which could be useful in police investigations trying to identify suspects at a
particular location or involved in a suspicious pattern of activity. 86
City-Wide Application Programming Interface

4.

The digital layer of a truly smart city could have a very public face: the
Application Programming Interface ("API").87 A shared API could allow
government services and third-party providers to share a software platform
which can communicate with the end user. As an early version of a smart city
prototype advertised, the goal is to design a "neighborhood built from the
internet up." 88

84.
Sarah Holder, The Shadowy Side ofLED Streetlights, BLOOMBERG CITYLAB (Mar. 8, 2o18,
9:44 AM), https://www.citylab.com/equity/2o18/03/their-lights-were-watching-odd/ 5 5 4 696
[https://perma.cc/ 4 S 4 Z-BJ2Z] ("San Diego's deputy chief operating officer told IEEE Spectrum
that the city's new sensor-enabled lights could eventually be hooked up to the city's ShotSpotter
network, helping to identify the source of gunfire and 'automatically alert police to dangerous
situations' by picking up audio from the ground. The sounds of violence are defined as breaking
glass and shots fired, but it's not hard to imagine that raised voices could be linked to real people,
and draw similar scrutiny.").
85. Jake Laperruque, Preventing an Air Panopticon:A Proposalfor Reasonable Legal Restrictions
on AerialSurveillance, 51 U. RICH. L. REV. 705, 717 (2017) ("[T]he tracking technology, BriefCam,
allows law enforcement to overlay hours of video and then isolate individuals based on certain
factors so monitors can view all applicable targets with hours of time reduced to minutes. This
can be used to isolate all individuals or cars that are a particular color, or traveling on a specific
route. With such technologies, police could 'reverse-engineer' location tracking, picking a route
they want to monitor, then use BriefCam to immediately isolate and identify everyone who used
it over the course of several hours." (footnotes omitted)).
86.

See Andrew Guthrie Ferguson, The Internet of Things and the Fourth Amendment of Effects,
(describing the rise of Internet of Things technology as
surveillance) ; I Know What You'Il Do Next Summer: MoreData and SurveillanceAre TransformingJustice,
104 CALIF. L. REV. 805, 812 (2016)

ECONOMIST: TECH.

Q.

(June 2, 2018), https://www.economist.com/technology-quarterly/2o18-

05-02/justice [https://perma.cc/ 7 XMV-RRM8]; Valentino-DeVries et al., supra note 77.

87.
An Application Programming Interface is essentially an operating system that allows
developers to program on a shared digital platform. See Petr Gazarov, What Is an API? In English,
Please., FREECODECAMP (Dec. ig, 2oig), https://medium.freecodecamp.org/what-is-an-api-inenglish-please-b88oa3214a82 [https://perma.cc/gCKF-EKJM].
88.
Laura Bliss, How Smart Should a City Be? Toronto Is Finding Out, BLOOMBERG CITYLAB
(Sept. 7, 2018, 9:19 AM), https://www.citylab.com/design/2oi8/og/how-smart-should-a-citybe-toronto-is-firiding-out/569116 [https://perma.cc/ML 4 4 -ZNgS].
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To build a city "from the internet up," one must design a city that
includes a digital layer.19 So, in addition to a physically visible public street
level and a hidden underground layer for utilities, a truly "smart" city would
integrate a city-wide digital layer.90
The digital layer will include a set of APIs, creating a stable and welldesigned canvas on which developers can build applications to
reimagine and reinvent how the city works. In much the same way
that software platforms like Apple's App Store, the Google Play
Store, and Amazon Web Services have stimulated creativity on the
web and in personal devices, the digital layer provides a set of APIs,
with documentation and developer support that will inspire the
same creativity in the city. APIs include regulated access to city data
and the ability to interact with the city infrastructure in ways that are
safe and consistent with other uses.91
The idea is that the city could become a digital smart platform akin to a
smartphone platform with government services and third-party services
available through shared applications.92 The city would make its platform
available to developers to invent additional consumer conveniences for
residents.93 If the city becomes the platform, then the API is the key to the
city.
The goal of this digital layer is three-fold. First, it would allow flexibility
to ensure the city can update its technology and capacity.94 Since technology
must upgrade to avoid becoming obsolete, so must a smart city. In addition,
the sensor data collected allows city administrators to create predictive models
based on real city data, so that municipal officials can build a digital replica

89.
Nancy Scola, Google Is Building a City of the Futurein Toronto. Would Anyone Want to Live
There?, POLITICO MAG. (July/Aug. 2018), https://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2o18/
o6/29/google-city-technology-toronto-canada-218841 [https://perma.cc/TYB2- 3 K 3 W].
90.
Summers, supra note 50 ("At the highest level is the digital layer, which combines a
network of sensors, a detailed map of the neighborhood, simulation software and a platform
where citizens can log in and manage their public and private data.").
91.
SIDEWALK
LABS, RFP
No. 2017-13
app.
70
(Oct.
2017),
https://
www.passivehousecaiada.com/wp-content/uploads/ 2017/12 /TO-Sidewalk-Labs-Vision-Sectionsof-RFP-Submissiori-sm.pdf
[https://perma.cc/DBW 5 -UDCE].
In
2020,
Sidewalk
Labs
announced it would not be pursuing Waterfront Toronto as a smart city project. Andrew J.
Hawkins, Alphabet's Sidewalk Labs Shuts Down Toronto Smart City Project, VERGE (May 7, 2020, 11:56
AM), https://www.theverge.com/2020/5/7/212 5 0 5 9 4 /alphabet-sidewalk-labs-toroito-quaysideshutting-down [https://perma.cc/L2V6-77RD].

Elizabeth Woyke, A Smarter Smart City, MIT TECH. REV. (Feb. 21, 2018), https://
92.
www.techiologyreview.com/s/61o249/a-smarter-smart-city [https://perma.cc/A8QS-XP8R].
93.
Id. ("Details are still under discussion, but Sidewalk plans to let third parties access the
data and technologies, just as developers can use Google's and Apple's software tools to craft
apps. In fact, Sidewalk anticipates that 8o percent of the work on Quayside will involve these third
parties.").
94.

SIDEWALK LABS, supranote 91, at 66.
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of city services and game out possible future scenarios.95 So, for example,
instead of guessing how traffic patterns might change from a closed highway,
city engineers can create a digital replica model of existing city usage to
predict the impact.
Second, the digital layer allows the cost of municipal services to be
quantified.9 6 This involves understanding where people go, what they do,
how they do it, and how they use government services, benefits, and
infrastructure.97 Everything from energy usage to pedestrian patterns can
be measured and evaluated using sensors.9 8 Public Wi-Fi spots can identify
individuals from the phones in their pockets, and sophisticated cameras and
overlapping sensors can monitor daily use of the public sphere.99
Third, a digital layer allows for a host of innovations over existing urban
design. For example, smart streets capable of directing traffic flow with
embedded, ever-changing LED lights,00 smart "[t]raffic signals ... autocalibrat[ing] to ease ... congestion,",-, road tolls and parking that could be
paid automatically,102 and smart sidewalks which could "sense movement,
gather data, and send information back to a centralized map of the
neighborhood."o3
The tracking power of this shared digital interface could be quite
powerful for surveillance purposes, especially if payments, government
benefits, and financial transactions are mediated through this third-party
records system. 104 Like Apple Pay, Lyft, or Uber, which do not work without a

95.
Id. at 66-67 ("A Model component-in development by Sidewalk's Model Lab-can
simulate 'what if' scenarios for city operations and inform long-term planning decisions. A Map
component collects location-based information about the infrastructure, buildings, and shared
resources in the public realm.").
96.

See Bliss, supra note 88.

97.
See SIDEWALK LABS, supra note 9 1, at 66-67 ("An Account component provides a highly
secure, personalized portal through which each resident accesses public services and the public
sector.").
98.

See Brian Barth, The Fight Against Google's Smart City, WASH. POST (Aug. 8, 2018,
AM), https://www.washitigtotipost.com/news/theworldpost/wp/2oi8/o8/o8/sidewalklabs [https://perma.cc/SW8G-8BP7].
11:o2

99.
SIDEWALK LABS, supra note 91, at 70 ("The size of Quayside makes it feasible to deploy
cameras with different capabilities covering the same spaces. This will help Sidewalk evaluate
trade-offs in technology and cost with apples-to-apples detection tasks on the same region.
Likewise, Quayside will have multiple overlapping communications networks-an opportunity to
evaluate relative value.").
100.
See Bliss, supra note 88 ("Tiles capable of melting snow, absorbing stormwater, and
directing traffic with LED lights would form the pavement underfoot.").

101.

Scola, supra note 89.

See Summers, supra note 50 ("The company is developing a platform with APIs that
relate to road tolls, curbs and parking.").
102.

103.

Bliss, supranote 88.

104.
See Tomas Likar, Your City Can't Become 'Smart' Without Proper Payment Infrastructure,
SMARTCITIESDIVE
(Aug. 29, 2018), https://www.smartcitiesdive.com/news/your-city-cant-
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smart device, the need for a trackable smart device may grow increasingly
necessary. Many government benefits (e.g., disability benefits, food stamps)
also may soon mandate some digital app and many private companies may
target third-party development through a shared API.105 These third-party
entities are in the data business and citizens are the product.10 6 The chosen
smart device and its revealing third-party records will become necessary parts
of life in a smart city.
B.

SMART SENSOR PRIVACY

As might be evident, the scope and scale of sensors embedded in smart
infrastructure can vary greatly. Simply by design choice, data can be shared or
siloed. Engineers can also design smart sensor systems to avoid the direct
collection of personal information.107 Knowing how much electricity travels
to homes in an affluent neighborhood may be useful without knowing which
particular mansion wastes the most energy. Knowing how many cars pass by a
smart street sign provides valuable traffic management information without
knowing who owns each car.1o' Building smart transportation grids does not
necessarily require revealing personally-identifiable information, because one
can blind sensors to personally-identifiable information.
But technologies designed to anonymize data run into two basic
problems. First, with enough information, individuals can de-anonymize the
data, revealing the very information sought to be kept private.109 In several
studies, researchers have shown that reidentification is quite easy. Though the
"smart road sensor" might only collect the number of vehicles travelling on it,
the growth of surveillance tracking devices like the city's license plate readers,
become-smart-without-proper-payment-infrastructure/531215
[https://perma.cc/VL6S-2BHH];
Woyke, supranote 92.
105.
Barth, supranote 98. Much of the debate over Quayside has been about whether citizen
data can or should be sold to third parties. See SIDEWALK LABS, DIGITAL GOVERNANCE PROPOSALS

FOR DSAP CONSULTATION 12 (2018), https://waterfrottorortto.ca/nbe/wcm/connect/
waterfront/41 979265-8o44-442a-9351-e28ef6c76d7o/18.1o.15_SWT_Draft+Proposals+Regarding
+Data+Use+and+Governance.pdfMOD=AJPERES
[https://perma.cc/EgCg-CSgS];
Sean
McDonald, Toronto, Civic Data, and Trust, MEDIUM (Oct. 17, 2018), https://medium.com/
@McDapper/toronto-civic-data-and-trust-ee7ab928fb68 [https://perma.cc/BJ66- 4 ZG8]; Bianca
Wylie & Sean McDonald, What Is a Data Trust?, CTR. FOR INT'L GOVERNANCE INNOVATION (Oct. 9,

2o18), https://www.cigiotlite.org/articles/what-data-trust [https://perma.cc/FS 5 G-YKJR].
1o6.
Ferguson, supra note io.
107.
Summers, supra note 50 ("We don't need an image of you.... What we need is your
outline, because then the computer can tell, 'Oh, that's a human. That's a person walking.' If all
I do is outline your body and there's no face, no color, no nothing, then there's no way I can
identify you. I've eliminated the privacy issue, but I've accomplished the goal." (quoting Sidewalk
Lab's Head of Urban Systems, Rohit Aggarwala)).
1o8.
See Finch & Tene, supra note 40, at 1612 ("While de-identification can no longer be
treated as a 'silver bullet,' de-identified data sets still provide significant social utility with lowered
privacy risks.").
10g.

Paul Ohm, Broken Promises of Privacy: Responding to the SurprisingFailureofAnonymization,

5 7 UCLA L. REV. 1701,

1716

(2010).
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cameras, smart tolls, Wi-Fi sniffers, cell-signal technologies, etc., might
undercut anonymity in practice.-o For example, considering the smart data
from our homes, cars, and persons, all of these data points can be aggregated
so that inferences can be drawn.- As privacy experts Kelsey Finch and Omer
Tene write, "[s]mart city technologies thrive on constant, omnipresent data
flows captured by cameras and sensors placed throughout the urban
landscape. These devices pick up all sorts of behaviors, which can now be
cheaply aggregated, stored, and analyzed to draw personal conclusions about
city dwellers."12 And, though it has not been tried in a smart city setting,
data experts have been able to re-identify de-identified datasets in other
contexts.3 This aggregation problem will only grow with more connected city
sensors allowing more individualized inferences to be drawn.
The second problem is largely one of consumer convenience. If smart
devices and ubiquitous sensors can make some of the hassles of life easier,
citizens will sync their lives to maximize these efficiencies. If you can buy
coffee with your smartphone, pay tolls without quarters, access your building's
security without a key, or get your trash picked up seamlessly, why would you

110.
Mark MacCarthy, New Directions in Privacy:Disclosure, Unfairness and Externalities, 6 I/ S:
J.L. & POLYFOR INFO. SOC'Y 4 2 5 , 511 (2011) ("As data aggregation continues, as linkages among
different data sets more [sic] extensive and as data mining analytics become more effective,
predictive inferences about people will become more accurate. People will be less able to protect
the secrecy of their information through concealment. Indirect inferences based on data
analytics will reveal these facts with an acceptable level of certainty that people do not wish to
reveal.").

1i 1. Hiller & Blanke, supra note 9, at 316 ("[T] he concepts of 'data fusion' or 'sensor fusion'
refer to the phenomenon of data collected from a variety of different sources being combined to
create more information and more powerful inferences than can be produced by the separate
sources. This phenomenon will become even more important with the proliferation of the many
varieties of sensors that will be connected in the smart cities." (footnote omitted)).
112.

Finch & Tene, supranote 40, at 1582.

Woo, supra note 32, at 961 ("True de-identification is quite difficult to accomplish
because the prevalence of big data often allows determined actors to reverse the de-identification
process and compromise a data subject's privacy."); see also Charlotte Jee, You're Very Easy to Track
Down, Even when Your Data Has Been Anonymized, MIT TECH. REV. (July 23, 2oig), https://
www.techriologyreview.com/20 19/07/23/1 340go/youre-very-easy-to-track-down-even-whenyour-data-has-been-anonymized
[https://perma.cc/C7X8-TU98]
("A paper back in 2007
showed that just a few movie ratings on Netflix can identify a person as easily as a Social Security
number, for example."); Kelsey Campbell-Dollaghan, Sorry, Your Data Can Still Be IdentifiedEven if
It's Anonymized, FAST CO. (Dec. io, 2o18), https://www.fastcompariy.com/90278465/sorry-yourdata-can-still-be-identified-even-its-anonymized
[https://perma.cc/P85J-GGL4]
(describing a
study by MIT Senseable City Lab in which researchers were able to match "two anonymized
datasets ... , one of mobile phone logs and the other of transit trips," with 17 percent accuracy
after one week and 95 percent accuracy after i i weeks); Corin Faife, The Safe Way to Build a Smart
City, BLOOMBERG CITYLAB (Oct. 2, 2017, 4 : 3 4 PM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/
("In a
[https://perma.cc/P7NW-Y8VS]
2017-1o-o2/the-smart-safe-way-to-build-a-smart-city
widely cited study from 2ooo, Harvard professor Latanya Sweeney (then at Carnegie Mellon)
found that 87 percent of Americans could be uniquely identified in a dataset by only gender,
date of birth, and ZIP code. That can then be cross-referenced with voter records to identify each
individual by name.").
113.
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not take advantage of the convenience? The only real cost is your personal
data, which you trade for better services.114 Smart sensors will thus likely evolve
around an ever-increasing focus on consumer convenience connected by
personally revealing information and Internet of Things devices. 15 Landlords
are already proposing facial recognition in apartments to keep out unwanted
guests. 6 Stores and services in a smart city may not be far behind in offering
sales or discounts to customers they recognize through their smart devices (or
biometrics) ."7 Once the city becomes the platform for digital existence, one
can imagine hundreds of consumer-focused apps being developed. But, of
course, all of this will only increase the government's ability to aggregate data
and draw inferences about individuals." 8
In addition to choices of anonymization, there is the choice of
localization. Each of the technologies discussed can exist in a non-networked
world. Each sensor could be engineered to retain data locally, eschewing
centralized collection and analysis. This choice values privacy over some of
the efficiencies and insights that could arise from mass data collection. But
again, the temptation of efficiency and aggregated insight will be difficult to
resist. The data is valuable, the convenience real, and the innovations helpful.
As will be discussed in the next several Parts, the design choices around
smart sensors have constitutional consequences because of the way the
Supreme Court has recently interpreted the Fourth Amendment in the

context of digital surveillance technologies. These Parts proceed in three
steps, first tracking the two dominant Fourth Amendment threshold search
tests under current doctrine and then responding to some obvious objections.
Part III will examine how smart sensors impact a reasonable expectation of
privacy in public. Part IV will examine how the Supreme Court's recent

114.
See Hiller & Blanke, supra note 9, at 323 ("Cities will often have no alternative but to
collect personal or identifiable information if they are going to become 'smarter."'); Carmichael,
supra note 18; Walls, supra note 18, at 1924-25.
115.
Mohanty et al., supra note 24, at 69 ("The use of the IoT can make smart cities feasible.
Smartphones, smart meters, smart sensors, and RFID, in essence, form the IoT framework in
smart cities.").

116.
Ginia Bellafante, The Landlord Wants Facial Recognition in Its Rent-Stabilized Buildings.
Why?, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 28, 2o1g), https://www.rtytimes.com/2o19/03/28/iyregiort/rentstabilized-buildings-facial-recognition.html [https://perma.cc/ 7 KJN-2AHY]; Alfred Ng, Tenants
Callfor Better Laws After Stopping FacialRecognition from Moving In, CNET (Nov. 22, 2019, 11:58
AM), https://www.cnet.com/news/tenants-call-for-better-laws-after-stopping-facial-recognitionfrom-moving-in [https://perma.cc/RC96-KFBY].
117.
Nick Tabor, Smile! The Secretive Business of Facial-RecognitionSoftware in Retail Stores, N.Y.:
INTELLIGENCER (Oct. 20, 2o18), http://tymag.com/ittelligetcer/2o18/to/retailers-are-usingfacial-recognition-technology-too.html [https://perma.cc/ 3 UKH-BF82].

118. Mike Weston, Smart Cities' Will Know Everything About You, WALL ST. J. (July 12, 2015,
6:36 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/smart-cities-will-know-everything-about-you-1436740596
[https://perma.cc/B2KV-RB84] ("In a fully 'smart' city, every movement an individual makes
can be tracked. The data will reveal where she works, how she commutes, her shopping habits,
places she visits and her proximity to other people.").
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"trespass test" would be applied to smart infrastructure. Finally, Part V looks
at whether any of the traditional Fourth Amendment exceptions apply.
III. THE FOURTH AMENDMENT & SMART SENSORS IN PUBLIC

This Part seeks to untangle the doctrinal confusion that has emerged
from the Supreme Court's early forays into digital surveillance technologies
and apply these insights to the equally unsettled world of structural sensor
surveillance.
The Fourth Amendment protects against "unreasonable searches and
seizures."119 Yet, despite its centrality to criminal procedure, the definition of
a "search" is still a contested issue. Over the years, different search tests have
emerged with oddly drawn doctrinal lines. Terms of art like a "reasonable
expectation of privacy,"12O "trespass,"121 "protected interest[s],"122 and
"reasonableness"23 have created a constitutional muddle.124 The introduction
of powerful digital surveillance technologies has only added to the
complications. Perhaps not surprisingly, an Amendment ratified in 1791 has
failed to adapt to the twenty-first century.
Structural surveillance adds to this complexity because the type of sensors
at issue may well determine the Fourth Amendment's impact on individual
privacy. This Part examines smart city sensors in public through the lens of
Fourth Amendment law, exploring how background principles, emerging
doctrinal themes, and precedent all suggest that some smart city innovations
might run afoul of the Fourth Amendment search doctrine.
A.

A DIGITAL REASONABLE EXPECTATION OF PRIVACY TEST IN PUBLIC

Like any city, a smart city requires public spaces for public activity. The
difference, however, is that public activity can be more easily tracked and
aggregated in a digitally monitored world. The open legal question is whether
by designing smart sensors to ubiquitously track and collect personal data over

119.

U.S. CONST. amend. IV.

120.

Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 360 (1967) (Harlan,J., concurring).

121.

United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 405 (2012).

Jack Wade Nowlin, The Warren Court's House Built on Sand: From Security in Persons, Houses,
Papers, and Effects to Mere Reasonablenessin Fourth Amendment Doctrine, 81 MIss. L.J. 1017, 103 1-32
(2012) ("This traditional [protected interest] approach emphasized the interests specifically
enumerated as protected in the text of the Fourth Amendment, 'persons, houses, papers, and
effects,' and the common-law principles rooted in property law that formed the important
broader legal context of the text.").
122.

123.
Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2482 (2014) ("[T]he ultimate touchstone of the
Fourth Amendment is 'reasonableness."' (quoting Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 403
(2006))).
124.
See Andrew Guthrie Ferguson, Personal Curtilage:Fourth Amendment Security in Public,
WM. &MARY L. REV. 1283, 1293-95 (2014).
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the long term, a smart city continually triggers Fourth Amendment concerns

about aggregated, long-term tracking without a probable cause warrant.12 5
To understand the problem, some background on the evolution of
the Fourth Amendment is necessary. Since 1967, the Fourth Amendment

threshold "search" inquiry has turned on whether the individual has a
subjective expectation of privacy that society would consider objectively
reasonable.12 6 If such a reasonable expectation of privacy is violated, the Court
finds that a Fourth Amendment search occurred.127 If such a search occurs
without a probable cause warrant or an applicable exception to the warrant
requirement, the search may violate the Fourth Amendment. The doctrine

has been called confused, and many scholars and a fewJustices have criticized
its use.12 8 Nevertheless, it remains the controlling law for both the physical
and digital worlds.129
Structural surveillance involves two types of potential public exposure.
First, there is the traditional physical exposure of people and things. Police in
smart cities, like in normal cities, can observe what police can observe using
traditional human means and are governed by existing Fourth Amendment
rules.so The second type of exposure is digital-involving direct collection of
tracking information of people living in those cities. The reality is that with
enough digital clues-be they municipal, consumer, financial, cellular, or

125.
The question remains open because bothJonesand Carpenteronlyaddressed longer-term
surveillance: 28 days in Jones and at least seven days in Carpenter.Jones, 565 U.S. at 403; Carpenter
v. United States, 1 3 8 S. Ct 2206, 2212 (2018).

126.

Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 360-61 (1967) (Harlan,J., concurring).

127.
This is the traditional understanding subject to a few limited exceptions. See Arizona v.
Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 338 (2oog) ("Consistent with our precedent, our analysis begins, as it should
in every case addressing the reasonableness of a warrantless search, with the basic rule that
'searches conducted outside the judicial process, without prior approval by judge or magistrate,
are per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment-subject only to a few specifically
established and well-delineated exceptions."' (quoting Katz, 389 U.S. at 357)).
128.
Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2244 (Thomas,J., dissenting) ("[T]he Katz test also has proved
unworkable in practice. Jurists and commentators tasked with deciphering our jurisprudence
have described the Katz regime as 'an unpredictable jumble,' 'a mass of contradictions and
obscurities,' 'all over the map,' 'riddled with inconsistency and incoherence,' 'a series of
inconsistent and bizarre results that [the Court] has left entirely undefended,' 'unstable,'
'chameleon-like,' "notoriously unhelpful,"' 'a conclusion rather than a starting point for
analysis,' 'distressingly unmanageable,' 'a dismal failure,' 'flawed to the core,' 'unadorned fiat,'
and 'inspired by the kind of logic that produced Rube Goldberg's bizarre contraptions."'
(footnote omitted)); Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 34 (2001) ("The Katz test-whether the
individual has an expectation of privacy that society is prepared to recognize as reasonable-has
often been criticized as circular, and hence subjective and unpredictable.").
129.
Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2217 ("A person does not surrender all Fourth Amendment
protection by venturing into the public sphere. To the contrary, 'what [one] seeks to preserve as
private, even in an area accessible to the public, may be constitutionally protected."' (quoting
Katz, 389 U.S. at 351-52)).
130.
See id.; see also California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 41 (1988) ("[T]he police cannot
reasonably be expected to avert their eyes from evidence of criminal activity that could have been
observed by any member of the public.").
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biometric-individuals can be tracked through the aggregated nature of the
information. If collected (and most data is designed to be collected), the
digital trails of life can be studied to identify individual people. After all, you
cannot enforce a trash tax if you do not know whose trash it is. This second
level of digital exposure is the subject of this Section.
1.

Reasonable Expectation of Privacy Principles

To understand how the "reasonable expectation of privacy" test works in
a public space, one must piece together a series of Supreme Court decisions.
To start, in United States v. Jones, five Justices agreed that 28 days of GPS
surveillance of Antoine Jones' car for a narcotics investigation was a Fourth
Amendment search that violated his reasonable expectation of privacy.131 This
was so even though the GPS tracking occurred in public (on public streets)
and even though the satellite data only revealed the whereabouts of his car.1 32
The concurrences' understanding of an expectation of privacy was later
incorporated by reference in the majority decision in Carpenter v. United
States.133
Carpenterreaffirmed the Supreme Court's commitment to digital privacy
in an age of ubiquitous tracking. Timothy Carpenter was tracked down for a
series of robberies because his cell phone signal revealed his location during
the crimes.134 Government agents requested seven days of cell-site tracking
data from Carpenter's cell phone company in an attempt to prove their
case. 135 The Supreme Court held that acquiring a week's worth of cell-site

131.
Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2220; see United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 416 (2012)
(Sotomayor, J., concurring) ("I would ask whether people reasonably expect that their
movements will be recorded and aggregated in a manner that enables the government to
ascertain, more or less at will, their political and religious beliefs, sexual habits, and so on. I do
not regard as dispositive the fact that the government might obtain the fruits of GPS monitoring
through lawful conventional surveillance techniques."); id. at 430 (Alito, J., concurring in
judgment) ("Under this approach, relatively short-term monitoring of a person's movements on
public streets accords with expectations of privacy that our society has recognized as reasonable.
But the use of longer term GPS monitoring in investigations of most offenses impinges on
expectations of privacy. For such offenses, society's expectation has been that law enforcement
agents and others would not-and indeed, in the main, simply could not-secretly monitor and
catalogue every single movement of an individual's car for a very long period." (citation
omitted)).

Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2215 ("Since GPS monitoring of a vehicle tracks 'every
132.
movement' a person makes in that vehicle, the concurring Justices [in Jones] concluded that
'longer term GPS monitoring in investigations of most offenses impinges on expectations of
privacy'-regardless whether those movements were disclosed to the public at large." (first
quoting Jones, 565 U.S. at 430 (Alito, J., concurring in judgment); and then quoting id. at 415
(Sotomayor,J., concurring))).
133.
Id. at 2217 (first citingJones, 565 U.S. at 415 (Sotomayor,J., concurring); and then citing
Jones, 565 U.S. at 430 (Alito,J., concurring)) ("A majority of this Court has already recognized that
individuals have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the whole of their physical movements.").
134.

Id. at 2211-12.

135.

Id. at 2212.
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location data without a warrant violated the reasonable expectation of
privacy.13 6 This was so even though the digital records were collected by a
private third party (the cell phone company) and held by that private
company in largely unidentifiable form (raw unstructured data).137 This was
so even though all that was revealed was his location in public.38 Like in Jones,
the Court reasoned that the revealing nature of aggregated locational data
required Fourth Amendment protection.
Finally, in Riley v. California, the Court recognized that access to stored
data files (either on a smart phone or in the connected cloud) required a
warrant even incident to a lawful arrest. 139 Police arrested David Riley and
searched his smartphone's photos without a warrant, eventually recovering
incriminating photographs.14 The Court held that the quantity and
qualitatively revealing nature of data on smartphone and digital devices was
too great a privacy concern to obtain without a probable cause warrant. 141 The
Court reasoned that the collection of digital clues revealed too much about
the privacies of life.
In Carpenter, the Justices focused on the personal, potentially sensitive
nature of the collected locational data as part of the violation of privacy. In
Jones, Justice Sonia Sotomayor similarly explained how "GPS monitoring
generates a precise, comprehensive record of a person's public movements
that reflects a wealth of detail about her familial, political, professional,
religious, and sexual associations."142 Justice Samuel Alito also envisioned a
privacy-invading, prototype smart city environment filled with surveillance
tracking technologies:
Recent years have seen the emergence of many new devices that

permit the monitoring of a person's movements. In some locales,
closed-circuit television video monitoring is becoming ubiquitous.
On toll roads, automatic toll collection systems create a precise
record of the movements of motorists who choose to make use of
that convenience. 143

136.

Id. at 2220-23.

137.
See Orin S. Kerr, Initial Reactions to Carpenter v. United States 16-17 (Univ. S. Cal. L.
Legal Stud. Paper No. 18-14, 2o18) [hereinafter Kerr, InitialReactions].
138.

Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2200-23.

139.

See Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2493-95 (2014).
Id. at 248o-81.

140.

141.
Id. at 2489 ("Cell phones differ in both a quantitative and a qualitative sense from other
objects that might be kept on an arrestee's person. The term 'cell phone' is itself misleading
shorthand; many of these devices are in fact minicomputers that also happen to have the capacity
to be used as a telephone. They could just as easily be called cameras, video players, rolodexes,
calendars, tape recorders, libraries, diaries, albums, televisions, maps, or newspapers.").

565

142.

United States v. Jones,

143.

Id. at 428 (Alito, J., concurring in judgment).

U.S. 400, 415 (2012) (Sotomayor,J., concurring).
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Similarly, the Carpenter Court repeatedly emphasized a concern with the
revealing nature of private information coming from our digital trails:
A cell phone faithfully follows its owner beyond public
thoroughfares and into private residences, doctor's offices, political
headquarters, and other potentially revealing locales.... [W]hen
the Government tracks the location of a cell phone it achieves near
perfect surveillance, as if it had attached an ankle monitor to the
phone's user.

. . . Yet this case is not about "using a phone" or a person's
movement at a particular time. It is about a detailed chronicle of a
person's physical presence compiled every day, every moment, over
1
several years. 44

In addition to the personal privacy harms of such tracking, the Jones Court
recognized the potential chilling of associational and expressive conduct from
digital monitoring.
Awareness that the government may be watching chills associational
and expressive freedoms. And the government's unrestrained power
to assemble data that reveal private aspects of identity is susceptible
to abuse. The net result is that GPS monitoring-by making available
at a relatively low cost such a substantial quantum of intimate
information about any person whom the government, in its
unfettered discretion, chooses to track-may "alter the relationship
between citizen and government in a way that is inimical to
democratic society."145
This informational privacy harm connects back to the Court's concern in Riley
about the revealing nature of digital information stored on our digital devices.
As the Court recognized, our digital devices likely reveal more about our
associations, interests, and beliefs than our homes.14 6
Linking Jones, Carpenter, and Riley together, a few principles can be
distilled as to when the Supreme Court will find a city-wide system of sensor
surveillance to be a search for Fourth Amendment purposes. The purpose of
this Section is to develop an analytical framework to show that city-wide
systems of sensor surveillance could raise Fourth Amendment problems if

144.

Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 22o6, 2218, 2220 (2018) (citations omitted).

145. Jones, 565 U.S. at 416 (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (quoting United States v. CuevasPerez, 64o F. 3 d 272, 285 ( 7 th Cir. 201) (Flaum,J., concurring)).
146.
Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2491 ("Indeed, a cell phone search would typically expose to the
government far more than the most exhaustive search of a house: A phone not only contains in
digital form many sensitive records previously found in the home; it also contains a broad array
of private information never found in a home in any form-unless the phone is.").
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designed carelessly. The next Section will apply these principles to some of
the sensor technologies discussed in Part II.
i.

Principle#i:Digitalis Different

The first lesson to be learned from these recent cases is that "digital is
different" when it comes to the Supreme Court's analysis.147 As evidenced in
Jones, Riley, and Carpenter, analog precedent will not control the digital
equivalent. The smartphone of Riley is not the equivalent container as the
cigarette pack in United States v. Robinson.148 The cell-site location records in
Carpenterare not the same as bank records or landline phone records in United
States v. Miller and Smith v. Maryland.149 The GPS tracking in Jones is not the
same thing as a team of police officers physically watching the same car in
public over time.
If digital is different, then smart sensors capable of tracking digital
signatures raise Fourth Amendment issues and will be evaluated with
heightened care. In fact, one way to look at Jones and Carpenteris to see them
as early smart sensor surveillance cases. The GPS device in Jones was a sensorlike device attached to a car, similar to many of the transportation innovations
like digital license plates or toll collection readers.150 Similarly, the cell-site
signal in Carpenteris similar to a host of wireless connecting points that will be

147.
Henderson, supra note 15, at 951 ("So, while Riley perhaps left things unanswered that
it could have addressed, it made very clear that when it comes to the Fourth Amendment, digital
is different." (footnote omitted)); Orin S. Kerr, Executing Warrantsfor DigitalEvidence: The Casefor
Use Restrictions on Nonresponsive Data, 48 TEX. TECH L. REV. 1, 27 (2015); see also Jennifer Stisa
Granick, SCOTUS & Cell Phone Searches: Digital Is Different, JUST SEC. (June 25, 2014),
https://www.justsecurity.org/12219/scotus-cell-phone-searches-digital
[http://perma.cc/
9 4 RH- 4 2EV] ("The most important takeaway from today's opinion is that Digital Is Different.").
148.
Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2485 ("A search of the information on a cell phone bears little
resemblance to the type of brief physical search considered in [prior precedents]."); see also
Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2214 ("[W]e rejected in Kyllo a 'mechanical interpretation' of the Fourth
Amendment and held that use of a thermal imager to detect heat radiating from the side of the
defendant's home was a search." (citation omitted)); United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218,
236 (1973) ("Having in the course of a lawful search come upon the crumpled package of
cigarettes, [Officer Jenks] was entitled to inspect it.. .. ").
149.
Carpenter, 1 3 8 S. Ct. at 2219 ("There is a world of difference between the limited types
of personal information addressed in Smith and Miller and the exhaustive chronicle of location
information casually collected by wireless carriers today."); see also United States v. Miller, 425
U.S. 435, 442 (1976) ("The [bank] checks are not confidential communications but negotiable
instruments to be used in commercial transactions. All of the documents obtained, including
financial statements and deposit slips, contain only information voluntarily conveyed to the banks
and exposed to their employees in the ordinary course of business. The lack of any legitimate
expectation of privacy concerning the information kept in bank records was assumed by Congress
in enacting the Bank Secrecy Act .... "); Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 744 (1979) ("The
[telephone] switching equipment that processed those [phone] numbers is merely the modern
counterpart of the operator who, in an earlier day, personally completed calls for the subscriber.
Petitioner concedes that if he had placed his calls through an operator, he could claim no
legitimate expectation of privacy.").
150.

Doubek, supra note 29.
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created in a city embedded with smart sensors. Like Jones and Carpenter,
structural surveillance is a digital surveillance system that likely will receive a
hard look by the Supreme Court.
ii.

Principle#2: The CourtDisfavors Arbitrary and "Too Permeating"Surveillance

The second lesson to be learned is that the Supreme Court is concerned
with arbitrary and pervasive police surveillance. The former focuses on the
potential to misuse police power to interfere with "the privacies of life,"151 and
the latter focuses on the widespread systems created to facilitate that
government interference. Smart sensors raise both concerns.
In Carpenter, Chief Justice John Roberts stated quite simply: "The 'basic
purpose of [the Fourth] Amendment,' our cases have recognized, 'is to
safeguard the privacy and security of individuals against arbitraryinvasions by
governmental officials.' "152 This comment directly echoedJustice Sotomayor's
concurrence in Jones where in the context of GPS tracking she stated, "the
Fourth Amendment's goal [is] to curb arbitraryexercises of police power."153
In both cases, the check on arbitrariness would have been a probable cause
warrant which would have limited police surveillance in an individualized and
particularized manner. Without such a requirement, police could use GPS
tracking or cell-site collection based on a lesser standard (or no standard),
leading to a concern with arbitrary use.
The Supreme Court's concern with such generalized police power evokes
colonial history and the Founders' fear of general warrants. Again, from
Carpenter
Although no single rubric definitively resolves which expectations
of privacy are entitled to protection, the analysis is informed by
historical understandings "of what was deemed an unreasonable
search and seizure when [the Fourth Amendment] was adopted."
On this score, our cases have recognized some basic guideposts.
First, that the Amendment seeks to secure "the privacies of life"
against "arbitrary power."154
Sensors that literally collect data about all citizens going about their business
in a smart city raise arbitrariness concerns. Depending on how they are
designed and the limitations in place, the very same concerns articulated in
Carpenterand Jones arise-only amplified across a city-scale.

13 4

Riley,

152.

Carpenter, 1 3 8 S. Ct. at 2213 (emphasis added) (quoting Camara v. Mun. Ct. of S.F., 387

U.S.

523, 528

S. Ct. at 2495 (quoting Boyd v. United States,

i16

151.

U.S. 616, 630 (1886)).

(1967)).

153.
United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 416 (2012) (Sotomayor,J., concurring) (emphasis
added).
154.
Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2213-14 (alteration in original) (emphasis added) (footnote
omitted) (citations omitted) (first quoting Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 149 (1925);
and then quoting Boyd, 1i16 U.S. at 630).
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Though the concern about arbitrary policing has to do with the
overbroad and unparticularized nature of data collection, the Supreme Court
was also concerned with setting up systemic surveillance. The language of
Carpenterexplicitly referenced that it was, "a central aim of the Framers. .. to
place obstacles in the way of a too permeating police surveillance."'155 In
her Jones concurrence, Justice Sotomayor made a similar reference to
6
"prevent[ing] 'a too permeating police surveillance."'15
City sensors designed to capture, analyze, and use citizen data can, with
little effort, become a permeating system of surveillance. In fact, depending
on how they are configured, the proliferation of smart sensors mightjust be
the definition of such a system. Worse, video systems with video analytics,
object recognition, and face-tracking capabilities almost provide a worst-case
version of "too permeating" surveillance.157 Again, if the cell-site location
system in Carpentertriggers Fourth Amendment concern, a city network where
cell-site location isjust one of numerous sensor collection efforts seems like a
significant Fourth Amendment problem.
iii. Principle#3: Aggregating and Permanent Tracking Technologies Raise Fourth
Amendment Concerns
The final lesson from the recent Supreme Court cases involves the nature
of the privacy harm. Three related concerns surface in the Court's opinions,
involving tracking, aggregation, and permanence of the data collected.
First, in Jones and Carpenter, the Supreme Court was concerned with
the tracking capabilities of new technology.15 8 Jones was an individual GPS
tracking case. Carpenterwasa cell-site network tracking case. Any surveillance
technology that allows long-term locational tracking will likely run squarely
into this precedent.
Smart sensors raise tracking concerns as the sensors literally can track
individuals across a city, revealing inferences drawn from locational details.159

Id. at 2214 (quoting United States v. Di Re, 332 U.S. 581, 595 (1948)).
Jones, 565 U.S. at 416-17 (Sotomayor,J., concurring) (quoting Di Re, 332 U.S. at 595).
157.
See Andrew Guthrie Ferguson, The High-Definition, Artificially Intelligent, All-Seeing Future
of Big Data Policing, ACLU (Apr. 4, 2018, 3:00 PM), https://www.aclu.org/issues/privacytechnology/surveillance-technologies/high-definition-artificially-intelligent-all
[https://perma.cc/
7 H88-MZKS].
155.
156.

158.
Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2216 ("The question we confront today is how to apply the Fourth
Amendment to a new phenomenon: the ability to chronicle a person's past movements through
the record of his cell phone signals. Such tracking partakes of many of the qualities of the GPS
monitoring we considered in Jones. Much like GPS tracking of a vehicle, cell phone location
information is detailed, encyclopedic, and effortlessly compiled."); id. at 2217 ("As with GPS
information, the time-stamped data provides an intimate window into a person's life, revealing
not only his particular movements, but through them his 'familial, political, professional,
religious, and sexual associations."' (quotingJones, 565 U.S. at 415 (Sotomayor,J., concurring))).
159.
SeeJones, 565 U.S. at 416 (Sotomayor, J., concurring) ("I would ask whether people
reasonably expect that their movements will be recorded and aggregated in a manner that
enables the government to ascertain, more or less at will, their political and religious beliefs,
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If the GPS tracking in Jones violates a reasonable expectation of privacy, and
acquisition of Timothy Carpenter's tracked cell-site signals violate an
expectation of privacy, almost any person caught in a web of smart sensors
with similar tracking capabilities will have a Fourth Amendment argument.1 60
Second, in Jones, Carpenter, and Riley, the Court recognized that the
aggregation of collected personal data created a distinct harm. In Jones, five
Justices ruled that 28 days of tracking violated an expectation of privacy
because of the aggregated locational details revealed.1 61 Similarly, in Riley, the
Court recognized that the aggregation of information in a smartphone
dwarfed a more limited collection of personal data.1 6 2 The Riley Court
expressly addressed the qualitatively and quantitatively different nature of
digital information collected on a smartphone-mini-computer. Finally,
Carpenter echoed the dangers of aggregated locational collection through
seven days of cell-site location data.1 6 3
Smart sensors can be networked and aggregated to provide equivalent
details about individuals. Though smart sensor data does not have to be
aggregated or networked, the more it is collected and processed, the more it
turns into a Fourth Amendment problem.

6

4

Finally, the Supreme Court expressed concern with a particular aspect of
the collection and aggregation of tracking data, namely that it creates a
backwards-looking permanent dataset which can be searched without legal
justification. As was mentioned by ChiefJustice Roberts, the collection of data
created a "time-machine" problem. 6 5 As the Court stated in Carpenter

sexual habits, and so on."); id. at 430 (Alito,J., concurring injudgment) ("[S]ociety's expectation
has been that law enforcement agents and others would not-and indeed, in the main, simply
could not-secretly monitor and catalogue every single movement of an individual's car for a
very long period. In this case, for four weeks, law enforcement agents tracked every movement
that respondent made in the vehicle he was driving. We need not identify with precision the point
at which the tracking of this vehicle became a search, for the line was surely crossed before the 4week mark.").
i6o.
Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2218 ("In fact, historical cell-site records present even greater
privacy concerns than the GPS monitoring of a vehicle we considered inJones.").
161.

Id. at 222o;Jones, 565 U.S. at 403, 413, 415, 430.

162.
Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2489 (2014) ("The storage capacity of cell phones
has several interrelated consequences for privacy. First, a cell phone collects in one place many
distinct types of information-an address, a note, a prescription, a bank statement, a video-that
reveal much more in combination than any isolated record. Second, a cell phone's capacity allows
even just one type of information to convey far more than previously possible. The sum of an
individual's private life can be reconstructed through a thousand photographs labeled with dates,
locations, and descriptions; the same cannot be said of a photograph or two of loved ones tucked
into a wallet. Third, the data on a phone can date back to the purchase of the phone, or even
earlier. A person might carry in his pocket a slip of paper reminding him to call Mr. Jones; he
would not carry a record of all his communications with Mr. Jones for the past several months, as
would routinely be kept on a phone.").
163.

Carpenter, 13 8 S. Ct. at 2212, 2220.

164.

See infra Section III.B.

165.

Henderson, supra note 15, at 939.
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Moreover, the retrospective quality of the data here gives police
access to a category of information otherwise unknowable. In the
past, attempts to reconstruct a person's movements were limited by
a dearth of records and the frailties of recollection. With access to
CSLI [Cell-Site Location Information], the Government can now
travel back in time to retrace a person's whereabouts, subject only to
the retention polices [sic] of the wireless carriers, which currently
66
maintain records for up to five years.,
Like the revealing nature of information in David Riley's smartphone, the
Court was concerned with the ability to collect personal data for one purpose
but then have it available to search for any other purpose later on in time.
2.

Fourth Amendment Principles for Structural Surveillance

The Supreme Court is still in the process of exploring how the Fourth
Amendment fits the digital age. Yet, at least with surveillance technologies like
smart sensors, its recent cases offer some clarity. Along the continuum of
Fourth Amendment concerns, any surveillance system that (1) is arbitrarily
applied; (2) is permeating in scope; (3) allows tracking; (4) aggregates
personal details; and (5) can be permanently searched by government agents
raises real Fourth Amendment concerns. City-wide smart sensors hit each of
those concerns and, depending on how they are deployed, may face serious
Fourth Amendment problems. At least when data is used against defendants
in criminal cases,1 6 7 the more centralized a system of sensor data collection,
the more Fourth Amendment issues arise.

This Section seeks to apply this framework to four specific technologies
discussed in Part II. Working backwards from the most centralized,
aggregated, and networked to the least, this Section will address the Fourth
Amendment implications of: (1) a city-wide API; (2) a networked video
analytics system; (3) government-regulated utilities; and (4) smart sensorenabled streetlights. As will be seen, the Fourth Amendment search analysis
will depend on the design choices to keep data localized, networked,
aggregated, and/or centralized.
B.

THE FOURTHAMENDMENT APPLIED TO SMART SENSORS

As discussed in Part II, sensor data can be networked or isolated,
aggregated or siloed. Further choices about tracking or anonymity can be
built into the network's design specifications. As explained below, along the
continuum of data collection available with smart sensors, the Fourth

166.

Carpenter, i38 S. Ct. at 2218.

As will be discussed, there exists an open Fourth Amendment question about how to
167.
litigate concerns over generalized mass surveillance. Issues of standing and harm arise and might
limit the impact of the Fourth Amendment. But, at least in terms of data used in criminal cases
against criminal suspects, the Fourth Amendment harms will be justiciable.
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Amendment is most concerned about arbitrary, permeating, aggregating,
permanent, and individualized systems of surveillance.1 68 The farther along
the continuum, the more likely the acquisition of information would be a
Fourth Amendment search.

1.

Integrated Data Collection Systems: API

Smart things and smarter people will wander around a smart city.1 69
These people could be connected by a digital layer that tracks various
movements and actions.170 This layer might involve an interconnected system
of sensors which might include RFID chips, cellular connections, Wi-Fi,
Bluetooth, or technologies not yet invented.171 In an API, the goal is to stream
data back to either a central government monitoring service or private
contractors to improve the functioning of city services. As the city becomes
the digital platform, tracking technologies will link back to an identifiable
object (e.g., car or person). This ubiquitous connection-collection through
a digital layer-likely violates a reasonable expectation of privacy because it
is doing exactly the type of aggregated, continuous personal data acquisition
of locational data by government agents criticized by Carpenter and in Jones
(in concurrence).172 At least when linked to an identifiable object (e.g.,
smartphone, smart car, smart home, biometric signature), this type of
tracking is a Fourth Amendment search.
Under a reasonable expectation of privacy theory, are integrated, citywide API systems unconstitutional if they continually acquire and aggregate
this type of comprehensive personal data without a warrant? The answer
is probably "yes," at least for tracking of individuals in public over a period
of time. The information is aggregated, building up the same type of
informational harm as Jones' GPS tracking.173 The information is revealing,

168.
Other scholars have addressed how the Fourth Amendment might be better considered
in a systemic way. See Daphna Renan, The Fourth Amendment as AdministrativeGovernance, 68 STAN.
L. REV. 1039, 1042 (2016) ("While our Fourth Amendment framework is transactional, then,
surveillance is increasingly programmatic."); Christopher Slobogin, Policing as Administration,
165 U. PA. L. REV. 91, 92-97 (2016); Tracey L. Meares, Programming Errors: Understanding the
Constitutionality of Stop-and-Frisk as a Program,Not an Incident, 82 U. CHI. L. REV. 159, 162 (2015).
My argument here is different in that the system at issue is literally a system of surveillance, not
just a conceptual way to think about police power.

169.
See Mark Underwood, Smart Car, Meet the Smart City, DAILY BEAST (July 12, 2017, 7:37
PM), https://www.thedailybeast.com/smart-car-meet-the-smart-city
[https://perma.cc/C98ZN 5 2D].
170.

See supranotes 85-92 and accompanying text.

171.

See supranotes 98-103 and accompanying text.

172.

See supra Section III.A.1.

173.
Ferguson, "Smart" Fourth, supra note n1, at 6o6 ("[W]hile Justice Scalia attempted to
ground his Jones argument in property rights, the harm of affixing the GPS device was not in any
real sense to physical property (the car was undamaged). The real harm was exposing the
revealing personal data about the effect (car). . . . The 'use' in that case was the capturing of data
trails via satellite transmissions communicated by cell phone to a government computer. By using
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opening inferential clues about interests and activities like the Carpenter
records.174 The information is being acquired by state actors, at the direction
of government officials (including law enforcement). As Paul Ohm has
written, data that is "deeply revealing" and allows for a deep, broad, and
comprehensive reach by automatic means is exactly the type of invasion the
CarpenterCourt found violated the Fourth Amendment.175
Interestingly, this Fourth Amendment search occurs even if the system
does not identify a person by name, but only a unique tracking number. From
a Fourth Amendment perspective-similar to Timothy Carpenter's cellphone
and cell-site location tracking-the fact that the government is just collecting
a digital identifier (not a name) does not avoid the Fourth Amendment
problem.17 6 In Carpenter, police "searched" when they acquired and gained
access to the third-party data which could later be used to identify Timothy
Carpenter's location.177 In the smart sensor context, whenever a government

entity acquires any of these data trails (which could be every moment of the
day through ever-present sensors), this act could run afoul of the reasonable
expectation of privacy search test. Again, applying reasonable expectation of
privacy in public principles, this type of aggregated collection of location is a
warrantless search.17 8
Also, the fact that sensors might be controlled by third-party vendors does
not change the reach of the Fourth Amendment. First, the Supreme Court

plainly stated that "the fact that the information is held by a third party does
not by itself overcome the user's claim to Fourth Amendment protection."179
The Fourth Amendment applies when "the Government employs its own
surveillance technology ... or leverages the technology of a [private company]."i"o
As Justice Alito noted in his Carpenter dissent, "the Court effectively
allows Carpenter to object to the 'search' of a third party's property, not

the car to track its owner, the government invaded the informational security of the effect."
(footnotes omitted)).
174.
Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 22o6, 2218 (2018) ("[T]he Court has already
rejected the proposition that 'inference insulates a search."' (quoting Kyllo v. United States, 533
U.S. 27, 35 (2001))).
175.
Paul Ohm, The Many Revolutions of Carpenter, 32 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 357, 370 (2019)
(quoting Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2223).

176.
In Carpenter, what was collected was a number associated with an identifier. The
name Timothy Carpenter had to be linked via these digital identifiers. See Carpenter, 138 S. Ct.
at 22 11-12.

177.

Orin Kerr, When Does a Carpenter Search Start-and when Does It Stop?, LAWFARE (July 6,
10:24 AM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/when-does-carpenter-search-start-and-whendoes-it-stop [https://perma.cc/E83X-LWKU] (discussing the open questions after Carpenterof
when a Fourth Amendment search of digital cell-site records starts and ends).

2018,

178.
This conclusion again assumes a collection of data that is used in a criminal case.
Standing to bring a similar challenge as a civil rights action or facial challenge is a hurdle that
would need to be cleared.
179.

Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2217.

18o.

Id. (emphasis added).
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recognizing the revolutionary nature of this change."S1 So the fact that smart

cities would rely on third-party data collectors as intermediaries would not
extinguish Fourth Amendment claims.
It also does not matter that the data is collected for commercial purposes.
As the Carpenter Court stated, "[a] lthough such records are generated for
commercialpurposes, that distinction does not negate Carpenter's anticipation
of privacy in his physical location."1 8 2 Thus, in a smart city, even one
"managed" by a private company, the fact that records were held by a
commercial party would not extinguish constitutional expectations of privacy.
Essentially, the Court erased the distinction between rules governing searches
of digital records and physical searches of people, homes, papers, and
effects.13 Now both types of searches require a reasonable expectation of
privacy analysis.1 8 4
If accurate, this reading of Carpenter directly impacts the ability of
government to access third-party records and raises the real concern that
in automatically acquiring these records, the government is routinely
"searching" without a warrant. If the magic of a smart city is to constantly and
seamlessly collect third-party data from all its citizens through an API, then by
design the government is acquiring constitutionally-protected records
without a warrant. At least for comprehensive, aggregated, digital records that
are the type that would deserve a reasonable expectation of privacy, this
collection runs afoul of the Fourth Amendment-unless a warrant or
applicable exception applies.
2.

Visual Surveillance & Object Recognition

Video cameras equipped with some level of object recognition
technology will be a part of a smart city.1s5 Object recognition software has
already made its way to not-so-smart cities through ALPRs,1 86 facial

181.

Id. at 226o (Alito, J., dissenting).

182.

Id. at 2217 (majority opinion) (emphasis added).

183.
Id. at 2255 (Alito, J., dissenting) ("For the majority, this case is apparently no different
from one in which Government agents raided Carpenter's home and removed records associated
with his cell phone."); id. ("[The majority] decides that a 'search' of Carpenter occurred within
the meaning of the Fourth Amendment, but then it leaps straight to imposing requirements
that-until this point-have governed only actualsearches and seizures.").
184.

See id.

3; Scott Dunn, Harnessingthe Power of Video to Create Smart
Cities, SMARTCITIESDIVE (Oct. 9, 2018), https://www.smartcitiesdive.com/news/harnessing-thepower-of-video-to-create-smart-cities/5392o9
[https://perma.cc/SFA3-KF67]; Rick Rojas, In
Newark, Police Cameras, and the Internet, Watch You, N.Y. TIMES (June 9, 2018), https://
[https://
www.nytimes.com/2o18/o6/og/nyregion/newark-surveillance-cameras-police.html
perma.cc/8QDS-PR 5 U]; Aviva Shen, New Orleans Eyes Bars and Restaurants as New Focus of
Surveillance, BLOOMBERG CITYLAB (Feb. 9, 2018, 8:oo AM), https://www.citylab.com/life/
[https://
2o18/o2/new-orleans-eyes-bars-and-restaurants-as-new-focus-of-surveillance/552836
perma.cc/ULW 4 -S 7 CM].
185.

STANLEY, supra note 72, at

186.

Koops et al., supra note 8o, at 672-74.
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recognition technologies,18 7 and literal object recognition technology that
can, for example, pick out the color of a hat, or identify a particular sports
team logo on a shirt. 88 Coded digitally, the video images can be stored and
searched as needed.1 8 9
This collection of searchable video footage raises Fourth Amendment
concerns, but any conclusion rests on weighing the principles of aggregation,
permanence, and pervasiveness. From a pure tracking analogy, the ability to
track cars, people, or objects as they go about a city raises privacy concerns
similar to the Jones concurrence and the Carpentermajority. If a car's location
(for 28 days) or a cell phone's aggregated location (for seven days) violates a
reasonable expectation of privacy,190 so would this visual tracking surveillance
system that can reveal a car or a person across a city for a month or more. 191
A government agent accessing a database of stored video (searchable by
identifiable object) is not much different from a government agent accessing
a database of stored cell phone locations.
Of course, the level of individualized detail can be modified to protect
privacy. For example, a privacy-protective object recognition system could
identify the outlines or shadows of people, cars, and bicycles without
identifying the particular person associated.92 This type of technological fix
might avoid Fourth Amendment search problems (in theory) because the
identification would not be precise or searchable. But if a less privacyprotective model is adopted, the visual surveillance net will run square into
Fourth Amendment search principles.
Similarly, the localization of video surveillance might reduce Fourth
Amendment concerns. Along the continuum of systemic surveillance, a single
camera recording a street scene is qualitatively and quantitatively different
than a series of networked cameras that can track a person from street to
street over long periods of time.193 Minimizing aggregation and permanence
concerns and limiting tracking capabilities might be the difference between
a constitutional surveillance system and an unconstitutional one. In fact, the
more the technology avoids the principles articulated earlier, the more likely
the technology will survive Fourth Amendment scrutiny.

187.

Ira S. Rubinstein, Privacy Localism, 93 WASH. L. REV. 1961, 1972-73 (2018).

188.

See supranotes 61-62 and accompanying text.

189.

Fussell, supranote 70.

1go.

See supranotes 161-63 and accompanying text.

1g1.

See Andrew Guthrie Ferguson, FacialRecognition and the Fourth Amendment, 105 MINN. L.
REV. (forthcoming 2021).
192.

See supranote 107 and accompanying text.

See, e.g., People v. Tafoya, No. 1 7 CA12 4 3 , 2o1 9 WL 6 3 3 3 7 62, at *6-8 (Colo. App. Nov.
United States v. Houston, 965 F. Supp. 2d 855, 871 (E.D. Tenn. 2013); State v.Jones,
903 N.W.2d 101, 113-14 (S.D. 2017); United States v. Anderson-Bagshaw, No. 12-3074, 2012
WL 6600331, at *7 (6th Cir. Dec. 19, 2012).
193.

27,

2o1g);
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Public Utilities

A residential street in a smart city will have houses and apartments so
people can live there. These homes will become part of the smart
infrastructure of a city. Utilities will connect these dwellings using sensors
creating hard questions about which places should remain private and which
might lose an expectation of privacy.
The Supreme Court has acknowledged that "'[a]t the very core' of the
Fourth Amendment 'stands the right of a man to retreat into his own home
and there be free from unreasonable

governmental intrusion."'194

The

protection covers the information coming from inside the house that could
not otherwise be obtained by physical surveillance.195 In Kyllo v. United States,
the Court held that police interception of heat patterns emanating from a
home using a thermal imaging device was a Fourth Amendment search.9 6 In
Florida v. Jardines, the Court held that a dog sniff of marijuana scents outside
a front door was a Fourth Amendment search.197 Further, the concurring
Justices inJardinesargued that invasive visual surveillance into the house (e.g.,
with binoculars) would also be a search.198 The sensitive or intimate nature of
the information obtained was immaterial; all that mattered was the source of
the information-namely the home.199
In the smart sensor context, a smart home can become an incredibly

revealing source of intimate data. First, government entities like public
utilities might directly collect information from a private house. For example,
electrical

and water use from a smart home meter might be a direct

194.
Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 31 (2001) (quoting Silverman v. United States, 365
U.S. 505, 511 (1961)).
195.
Id. at 34 ("We think that obtaining by sense-enhancing technology any information
regarding the interior of the home that could not otherwise have been obtained without physical
'intrusion into a constitutionally protected area,' constitutes a search-at least where (as here)
the technology in question is not in general public use." (citation omitted) (quoting Silverman,
365 U.S. at 512)).
196.
Id. at 40 ("Where, as here, the Government uses a device that is not in general public
use, to explore details of the home that would previously have been unknowable without physical
intrusion, the surveillance is a 'search' and is presumptively unreasonable without a warrant.").
197.

Florida v. Jardines, 569 U.S. 1, 3-4,11-12 (2013).

198.
Id. at 12-13 (Kagan, J., concurring) (stating the Fourth Amendment protects against
"police officers ... standing in an adjacent space and 'trawl[ing] for evidence with impunity'
(alteration in original) (quoting id. at 6 (majority opinion))); see also Collins v. Virginia, 138 S.
Ct. 1663, 1671 (2o18) ("In physically intruding on the curtilage of Collins' home to search the
motorcycle, Officer Rhodes not only invaded Collins' Fourth Amendment interest in the item
searched, i.e., the motorcycle, but also invaded Collins' Fourth Amendment interest in the
curtilage of his home.").
199.
Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 37 ("In the home, our cases show, alldetails are intimate details,
because the entire area is held safe from prying government eyes."); id. at 38 ("[T]here is
no necessary connection between the sophistication of the surveillance equipment and the
'intimacy' of the details that it observes-which means that one cannot say (and the police cannot
be assured) that use of the relatively crude equipment at issue here will always be lawful.").
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government collection. Second, private companies might offer smart homes
filled with conveniences (e.g., smart thermostats, coffee makers, beds, and
toothbrushes), along with a host of augmented home information devices
(e.g., Amazon Echo, Google Home, Nest, Facebook's Portal TV).-o0 This data
usually finds itself mediated by a private third-party company, but reveals
granular details about when people wake up, eat, sleep, have sex, shower,
listen to music, and when and what they watch on television.-1 In a smart city,
like a normal city, warrantless collection of this information from a home
would be a Fourth Amendment search.
The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals recently held that the government
collection of electricity levels from a home using a "smart meter" constituted
a Fourth Amendment search under Carpenter.202 The Court held that though
"reasonable," the act of a public utility obtaining electricity information from
a home through a smart meter was technically a "search."203 Relying on
Carpenter, the Seventh Circuit reasoned that whether viewed as a government
entity or a private third party, the Fourth Amendment still protected this
private information originating from a constitutionally-protected source like
the home.204 Other digital trails collected directly from a home's smart devices
will likely be similarly analyzed as protected because of their shared source.
Along the continuum of digital search principles, the collection of
private information from private homes is pretty significant. Though
the tracking principle is not implicated, concerns about aggregation,
permanence, permeation, and the fact that it would arbitrarily apply to
everyone without individualized suspicion, all raise real concerns. In fact,
many of the traditional Fourth Amendment search principles blend with new
principles to make a strong claim that the warrantless collection of data from
our homes (even as utilities or infrastructure) would be a search.
Of course, if data control mechanisms were designed to avoid some
of the Fourth Amendment concerns, the constitutional analysis might be
different. First, if the data was not identifiable, the aggregation and privacy
problems would abate. Second, if the data was not permanently stored,
concerns about retrospective searching could be avoided. Third, if the data
were siloed from other forms of data collection, one type of utilities data (i.e.,
water usage, electricity) might not be seen as invading an expectation of

See generally Ferguson, "Smart"Fourth, supra note ii (discussing how data collected from
2oo.
"smart" devices should be protected under the Fourth Amendment).

201. SeeJoshua McNichols, A Smart Home Neighborhood: Residents Find It Enjoyably Convenient
or a Bit Creepy, NPR (Nov. 9, 2019, 3:04 PM), https://www.npr.org/2o1g/1 1/09/777747209/
a-smart-home-neighborhood-residents-find-it-enjoyably-convenient-or-a-bit-creepy
[https://
perma.cc/7 5 Z6-78HP] (discussing the selling of a data-driven and data-collecting home).
202.
2018).

Naperville Smart Meter Awareness v. City of Naperville, goo F.3 d 521, 526-27 ( 7 th Cir.

203.

Id.

204.

Id.
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privacy. As will be discussed in Part VI, all of these technical choices to collect,
share, aggregate, or deanonymize data are choices that can be made at a citywide level to protect privacy.
4.

Smart Streetlights

On the safest side of the Fourth Amendment continuum are smart

sensors that by design are programmed to limit the collection of data. Smart
streetlights offer a good example. One version of a smart streetlight mightjust
be a sensor that provides data about electrical efficiency, use, or need of
repair.05 Another type could be a sensor that triggers when a person passes
by as a signal to light up, but does not capture any other information.20 6 Of
course, the streetlights could be linked in a network of other streetlights, and
energy data could be aggregated.207 But a lack of identifying information and
tracking capabilities could also remove it from Fourth Amendment scrutiny.
Simple sensors, if designed to remain simple, localized, and limited,
might well remain outside of core Fourth Amendment concerns. As many
sensors can be designed to be networked or not, and to collect limited
information or not, this recognition might suggest a way forward for city
design. As will be discussed, these data choices at the sensor level might have
much broader constitutional implications for society.20 8
Of course, smart streetlights need not remain siloed and limited in
capability. Early deployments have raised concerns that these simple sensor
devices could be repurposed to collect additional data including locational
information.209 Sensors can advance in collection capacity and be connected
relatively easily to things like video.210 As one civil liberties advocate cautioned,
"I think rather than call them smart bulbs in smart cities I'd call them
surveillance bulbs in surveillance cities."211 Though not originally designed to
collect anything other than maintenance data about the lights themselves, the

205.

NYPA InstallsMore than 2,4oo LED Streetlights Throughout New York City, T&D WORLD (Jan.

14, 2020), https://www.tdworld.com/electric-utility-operations/article/2

1120518/nypa-installs

-more-than-24oo-led-streetlights-throughout-new-york-city [https://perma.cc/NRJ5-LC5L].
206.

See MAHADEV EAKAMBARAM, INTEL, SMART STREET

AND OPPORTUNITIES

1, 3

(2017),

LIGHTS FOR BRIGHTER SAVINGS

https://www.intel.com/content/dam/www/public/us/en/

documents/solution-briefs/smart-street-lights-for-brighter-savings-solutionbrief.pdf
perma.cc/ 7 EXZ-9 2N 3 ].

[https://

207. Justin Rohrlich & Dave Gershgorn, The DEA and ICE Are Hiding Surveillance Cameras in
Streetlights, QUARTZ (Nov. g, 2018), https://qz.com/1458475/the-dea-and-ice-are-hidingsurveillance-cameras-in-streetlights [https://perma.cc/VT 4 K-GQKF].

208.

See infra Part VI.

2og.

Gomez, supra note 48.

2 10.

See Sarah Holder, In San Diego, Smart' Streetlights Spark Surveillance Reform, BLOOMBERG
CITYLAB (Aug. 6, 2020, 12:52 PM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2o2o-o8-o6/
a-surveillance-standoff-over-smart-streetlights [https://perma.cc/KHZ 5 -AYXV].
21 1.

Holder, supranote 84 (quoting Chad Marlow of the ACLU).
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growth of thousands of sensor locations has raised questions for how they
might be used in the future.212

C.

RESPONSES TO THE REASONABLE EXPECTATION OF PRIVACY PUZZLE

Smart sensor advocates might push back that such locational tracking
-even
on an API, city-wide scale-should not be considered a Fourth
Amendment issue. After all, the collections are conducted in public, the
tracking is ubiquitous rather than targeted, and citizens are consenting to
collection by being present and using city services. In addition, the type of
data, the mode of acquisition, and the purpose for collection are different in
kind than traditional Fourth Amendment law enforcement-focused searches.
Though not without some persuasive force, each one of those arguments was
explicitly or implicitly rejected in Carpenterin the context of far less invasive
cell-site location tracking. This Section briefly responds to these arguments,
examining concerns about: (i) public exposure; (2) consent-assumption of
risk; (3) the type of data at issue; and (4) the means of acquisition.
1.

Public Exposure

As an initial matter, take the argument that because the data collection
is all occurring in public, locational data does not deserve an expectation
of privacy. Before Jones and Carpenter, the argument that public exposure
undermined a reasonable expectation of privacy would likely be persuasive
with the caveat that the Knotts Court expressed concern about mass
surveillance in public.213 But after Jones and Carpenter, the long-term,
continuous collection of this type of aggregated public information
-including
public location tracking-is likely a search for Fourth
Amendment purposes. Compared to a GPS device on a car or a cell-site record
for a phone, the pervasive, multi-prong collection of smart city data vastly
overwhelms the type of single-source public surveillance now requiring a

212.
GUNSHOT

See POLICING PROJECT, N.Y.U. L., PRIVACYAUDIT & ASSESSMENT OF SHOTSPOTTER, INC.'S
DETECTION TECHNOLOGY

10-15

(2o1g),

https://statici.squarespace.com/static/

8a33e881b631bc6od 4 f8b31/t/ 5 d418o8geeie 5 oooob 5 f9f9/1 5 6 4 5 738397 5 7/Privacy+Audit
+and+Assessment+of+Shotspotter+Flex.pdf [https://perma.cc/BF88-YAGL]; Jesse Marx, Smart
Streetlights Aren't Delivering the Data Boosters Promised, VOICE OF SAN DIEGO (Apr. 29, 2020),
https://www.voiceofsandiego.org/topics/government/smart-streetlights-arent-delivering-thedata-boosters-promised [https://perma.cc/8KGL-YKYL].
5

213.
Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2215 (2018) ("This Court in Knotts,
however, was careful to distinguish between the rudimentary tracking facilitated by the beeper
and more sweeping modes of surveillance. The Court emphasized the 'limited use which the
government made of the signals from this particular beeper' during a discrete 'automotive
journey.' Significantly, the Court reserved the question whether 'different constitutional
principles may be applicable' if 'twenty-four hour surveillance of any citizen of this country [were]
possible."' (citation omitted) (quoting United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 283-85 (1983)));
Knotts, 460 U.S. at 284 ("[I]f such dragnet-type law enforcement practices as respondent
envisions should eventually occur, there will be time enough then to determine whether different
constitutional principles may be applicable.").
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warrant. The fact that people or data have been exposed to the public does
not end the Fourth Amendment analysis.

A second related argument is that maybe because of the explicit
surveillance threats inherent in a smart city, one's ordinary expectation of
privacy should be replaced with a specially defined smart city expectation of
privacy (which would be significantly less protective than that of a traditional
city). The argument would be that if you walk around a city with warning signs
symbolically and literally informing you that you have no expectation of
privacy, maybe you should not have any expectation of privacy. This argument
unearths the long-held criticism of the reasonable expectation of privacy
doctrine-that it can be too easily overcome if the government announces
that there is no longer an expectation of privacy.214
If the Fourth Amendment is going to apply in smart cities, however, it
cannot be that governments can simply circumvent constitutional protections
by announcing a city-wide change to expectations of privacy.215 The whole
point of the Fourth Amendment is to figure out the balance between
constitutional and unconstitutional searches, not erase the protections by
announcing the arrival of the smart surveillance state. Though other
exceptions or interpretations might apply, a blanket city-wide exception to the
Fourth Amendment by fiat will not hold.21 6
2.

Consent-Assumption of Risk

A second response might be that citizens assume the risk of losing their
privacy when they choose to live in a smart city-that by living in a smart city
one "consents" to digital tracking.217 Though not an irrational argument, it
runs against the Carpenter majority's determination that assumption of risk
should not be read into the use of societally necessary communication tools.21 8

214.
See Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 750 (1979) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (discussing
how law enforcement could not constitutionally search all mail just by announcing to the general
public that mail no longer had an expectation of privacy).
215.
William Shepard McAninch, UnreasonableExpectations: The Supreme Court and the Fourth
Amendment, 20 STETSON L. REV. 435, 444 (1991) (discussing how the government could not
eviscerate Fourth Amendment freedoms by fiat).

216.

See infra Section V.A (discussing the special needs exception).

217.
This argument either falls under the "consent exception" to the Fourth Amendment or
the related argument that one assumes the risk of disclosure by entering a smart city. Compare
Orin S. Kerr, The Casefor the Third-Party Doctrine, 107 MICH. L. REV. 561 (2oog) (explaining the
underlying consent theory of the third-party doctrine), with Richard A. Epstein, Privacy and the
Third Hand: Lessons from the Common Law of Reasonable Expectations, 24 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1199
(2oog) (challenging the consent argument).

218. Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 222o ("Cell phone location information is not truly 'shared' as
one normally understands the term. In the first place, cell phones and the services they provide
are 'such a pervasive and insistent part of daily life' that carrying one is indispensable to
participation in modern society." (quoting Riley v. California, 1 3 4 S. Ct. 2473, 2484 (2014))); see
also id. ("Virtually any activity on the phone generates CSLI, including incoming calls, texts, or e-
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We do not assume the risk or consent to cell-site tracking even though we
might understand (at some level) about how cell phones work. As the Court
states: "Apart from disconnecting the phone from the network, there is no
way to avoid leaving behind a trail of location data. As a result, in no
meaningful sense does the user voluntarily 'assume [] the risk' of turning over
a comprehensive dossier of his physical movements."9
Similarly, traveling in public in a smart city is not a voluntary
relinquishment of rights. Just as cell phone users do not voluntarily give up
their locational privacy in an ordinary city, citizens in a smart city are not
voluntarily giving up information that is being collected automatically and
ubiquitously. In a smart city, you cannot go "off the grid" because the city is
the grid.220 Like a cell tower, the collection simply happens and the automatic,
involuntary nature of this collection does not limit the Fourth Amendment's
reach and protection.221
This consent-assumption of risk argument was more directly repudiated
byJustice Neil Gorsuch in dissent: "Consenting to give a third party access to
private papers that remain my property is not the same thing as consenting to
a search of those papers by the government."222 Yes, you might choose to live in a
smart city, but you do not consent to unconstitutional tracking by choosing to
live there. Justice Gorsuch also dismissed a related "assumption of risk"
argument that by giving information to a third party, you assumed the risk of
the government obtaining it.223 Not only did this argument not make sense to
him in the context of cell phone companies, but it did not convince him for
other third-party situations.224 Like the majority, Justice Gorsuch viewed the
assumption of risk idea no longer viable in the digital age. Other scholars
have agreed that consent may not work with omnipresent surveillance
technologies.225

mails and countless other data connections that a phone automatically makes when checking for
news, weather, or social media updates.").

219.
220.

Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Smith, 442 U.S. at 745).
Thank you to Professor Wayne Logan for this point.

221.

See Matthew Tokson, Inescapable Surveillance, 105 CORNELL L. REV. (forthcoming 202

222.

Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2263 (Gorsuch,J., dissenting).

i).

223.
Id. ("The Court has said that by conveying information to a third party you 'assum[e]
the risk' it will be revealed to the police and therefore lack a reasonable expectation of privacy
in it. . . . That rationale has little play in this context. Suppose I entrust a friend with a letter and
he promises to keep it secret until he delivers it to an intended recipient. In what sense have I
agreed to bear the risk that he will turn around, break his promise, and spill its contents to
someone else? More confusing still, what have I done to 'manifest my willingness to accept' the
risk that the government will pry the document from my friend and read it without his consent?"
(alteration in original) (quoting Smith, 442 U.S. at 744)).
224.

Id.

225.
Neil Richards & Woodrow Hartzog, The Pathologies of Digital Consent, 96 WASH. U. L.
REV. 1461, 1484-86 (2019); Evan Selinger & Woodrow Hartzog, The Inconsentability of Facial
Surveillance, 66 LOY. L. REV. (forthcoming 2020) (manuscript at 103-05), https://
papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=35575o8 [https://perma.cc/LP 4 S-NH3Y].
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Type of Data

A third response might be that though some types of data that a smart
city collects could trigger Fourth Amendment concerns, not all city data
should be considered equally. Some data is more private than other data.22 6
Without the long-term, aggregated nature of collection and acquisition,
maybe much of the smart city falls outside of the Fourth Amendment's reach.
The CarpenterCourt implicitly makes this distinction about the type of
data at issue, suggesting that courts "consider[] 'the nature of the particular
documents sought' to determine whether 'there is a legitimate "expectation
of privacy" concerning their contents.'227 In dissent, Justice Anthony
Kennedy critiqued the creation of a "multifactor analysis-considering
intimacy, comprehensiveness, expense, retrospectivity, and voluntariness."22 8
Though meant as a critique of the majority, this insight might be helpful in
thinking through which forms of sensor data warrant Fourth Amendment
protection.229 It may be the case that to determine whether a search has
occurred, courts will be required to analyze not just the third-party nature
of the records, but also the type of sensor data, the information,
comprehensiveness, intimacy, and other factors.
This may provide a loophole for some smart city collection if it is
designed in a way to avoid over-collection or to limit collection of more private
data. Perhaps some smart data will need to be excluded because of the type
of personal information revealed. In fact, as will be discussed in Part VI, a
city might design its collection systems to avoid aggregation or long-term
collection and thus design itself outside of Fourth Amendment constraints.
4.

Acquisition of Data

The Carpenterdecision leaves many open questions, but one of the biggest
is when the "search" occurs. 230 Unlike a search by physical means, Carpenter
involved a request to obtain digital records held by a third party. Did
the search occur when the third-party cell phone company collected the
information, when the police asked for it, when they received it, when they
examined the digital information or at some other time?231

226.
Matthew Tokson, The Emerging Principles of Fourth Amendment Privacy, 88 GEO. WASH.
L. REV. 1, 4 (2020).
227.
228.

Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 221g (quoting United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 443 (1976)).
Id. at 2234 (Kennedy,J., dissenting).

Id. at 2231 ("For each 'qualitatively different category' of information, the Court
229.
suggests, the privacy interests at stake must be weighed against the fact that the information has
been disclosed to a third party." (quoting id. at 2216, 2219-2o (majority opinion))).
23o.
Kerr, InitialReactions, supra note 137, at 17-20; Orin S. Kerr, Implementing Carpenter,
in THE DIGITAL FOURTH AMENDMENT (forthcoming) (manuscript at 15-16), https://
papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfin?abstract_id=33o1257 [https://perma.cc/VG8R-F38C].
231.

SeeKerr, InitialReactions, supranote 137, at 17-20.
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The Court uses "acquire" and "acquisition"232 to hint that the
government request and/or subsequent possession of the records was the
moment the Fourth Amendment applied. The Supreme Court's language is
ambiguous, leaving the question simply unanswered. This ambiguity around
cell-site signals is heightened for sensor data. What would "acquire" or
"acquisition" mean in the context of smart sensors that are collecting data
both directly for government uses and by third parties all the time? Is the only
data of constitutional interest the data acquired by the government? Also,
does the government have to actually acquire the information or is the intent
to acquire enough? In Jones, the search occurred with the placement of the
GPS with the intent to gather information. If intent to acquire is enough,
might that mean that the placement of the smart city sensors themselves

would be enough to trigger constitutional scrutiny? Such a conclusion does
not make much analytical sense, but these questions are not answered by Jones
or Carpenter, leaving real uncertainty for smart city design.
D.

CONCLUSION: REASONABLY SMART EXPECTATIONS of PRIVACY IN PUBLIC

The Supreme Court's piecemeal approach to digital privacy has created
the unintended consequence that large-scale, smart city sensor systems likely
violate the existing reasonable expectation of privacy test-at least if done in
cooperation with law enforcement. Though perhaps an accident of doctrinal
development, the result is an impediment to smart city development. Simply
put, the expectations of modern privacy may not quite fit the expectations of
our future cities. As will be discussed in Part VI, this tension may necessitate a
change in expectations, or a change in law, or a change in technology-but it
does require some change.
This tension with the expectation of privacy in public is only the first of
two doctrinal analyses arising from existing Fourth Amendment law. The next
Part looks at the recently resurrected trespass theory of searches as applied to
structural surveillance.
IV. THE FOURTH AMENDMENT & SMART SENSORS AS TRESPASS SEARCHES

In addition to considerations of privacy, the Fourth Amendment is
2
concerned with security from government intrusion into private property. 33
Direct physical interference with personal property ("effects") or people or
homes has been a long-standing consideration in Fourth Amendment

232.

Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2214, 2220-24.

K. Clancy, What Does the Fourth Amendment Protect: Property, Privacy, or Security?,
33 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 307, 309 (1998) ("The Fourth Amendment was a creature of the
eighteenth century's strong concern for the protection of real and personal property rights
against arbitrary and general searches and seizures.").
233.

Thomas
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cases. 234 As the Court recognized in Carpenter, "[f]or much of our history,
Fourth Amendment search doctrine was 'tied to common-law trespass' and
focused on whether the Government 'obtains information by physically
intruding on a constitutionally protected area."'235
This theory of search as "trespass" or "physical intrusion" was reclaimed
in Jones v. United States, with Justice Antonin Scalia's majority opinion holding
that the placement of a GPS device on a car was a search for Fourth
Amendment purposes.23 6 In Jones, the Court held that a search occurs when
"[t]he Government physically occupied private property for the purpose of
obtaining information"237-in that case touching the bottom of the car with
the purpose of obtaining locational information about the suspect via a
GPS tracking device. One type of trespass search, then, occurs when the
government physically touches personal property with the intent to gather
information without a warrant.23 8
The Court expanded this theory to homes in Floridav. Jardines,where, in
another majority opinion written by Justice Scalia, the Court held that a
Fourth Amendment search occurred when police brought a drug-sniffing dog
onto the curtilage of a home.
"The Amendment establishes a simple baseline, one that for much of our
history formed the exclusive basis for its protections: When 'the Government
obtains information by physically intruding' on persons, houses, papers, or
effects, 'a "search" within the original meaning of the Fourth Amendment'
has 'undoubtedly occurred.'"239
The touchstone of the search turned on the physical intrusion into a
constitutionally protected space by government agents seeking information.240

234.
United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 404-05 (2012) ("We have no doubt that such a
physical intrusion would have been considered a 'search' within the meaning of the Fourth
Amendment when it was adopted.").
235.
Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2213 (quotingJones, 565 U.S. at 405, 406 & n.3);Jones, 565 U.S.
at 406 ("As explained, for most of our history the Fourth Amendment was understood to embody
a particular concern for government trespass upon the areas ('persons, houses, papers, and
effects') it enumerates.").
236. Jones, 565 U.S. at 404 ("We hold that the Government's installation of a GPS device on
a target's vehicle, and its use of that device to monitor the vehicle's movements, constitutes a
'search."' (footnote omitted)).
237.
Id.; see also id. at 414 (Sotomayor,J., concurring) ("[T]he trespassory test applied in the
majority's opinion reflects an irreducible constitutional minimum: When the government
physically invades personal property to gather information, a search occurs.").
at 407 (majority opinion) ("As Justice Brennan explained in his concurrence in
did not erode the principle 'that, when the Government does engage in physical
a constitutionally protected area in order to obtain information, that intrusion may
violation of the Fourth Amendment."' (quoting United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S.
276, 286 (1983) (Brennan, J., concurring))).
239.
Florida v.Jardines, 569 U.S. 1, 5 (2013) (quotingJones, 565 U.S. at 406-07 n.3).

238.
Id.
Knotts, Katz
intrusion of
constitute a

240.

Id.
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Finally, in Grady v. North Carolina, the Supreme Court applied the trespass
theory to "persons."241 In Grady, the question before the Court was whether
attaching a satellite-enabled monitoring device to a person as a condition of
probation constituted a search.242 As a registered sex offender, Grady was
required by state law to wear a GPS-like device.243 He objected on Fourth
Amendment grounds and the Court, applying the trespass-touch-physical
intrusion theory of Jones and Jardines, agreed with his argument. 244 "In light of
[Jones and Jardines], it follows that a State also conducts a search when it
attaches a device to a person's body, without consent, for the purpose of
tracking that individual's movements."245 The Court held that it was
immaterial that the regulation was civil and not criminal in nature,
recognizing '"that the Fourth Amendment's protection extends beyond the
sphere of criminal investigations,' and the government's purpose in collecting
information does not control whether the method of collection constitutes a
search."24 6 Thus, the third type of trespass search is when the government
physically touches the person with the intent to gather information without a
2
warrant. 47

Applied to smart sensors embedded in our physical world, this Fourth
Amendment trespass search rule raises a few hard questions. Though the
vast majority of the surveillance apparatus will focus on digital, non-touching
sensor searches, smart cities will still create a few anomalous trespass
problems. For example, a smart sidewalk that records each footstep will
technically meet the definition of a Fourth Amendment trespass search.248
The government will be physically touching people, with the intent to gather
information about them. Though we do not usually think of the ground we
walk on as touching us, it is in fact doing so. The same would hold for cars
driving on smart roads which collect the data about driver's speed, erratic
behavior, etc. Like the trespass definition from Jones, the government (here,

241.

Grady v. North Carolina, 135 S. Ct. 1368, 1370-71 (2015) (per curiam).

242.

Id. at 1369-70.

243.

Id. at 1369.

244.
245.

Id. at 1369-71.
Id. at 1370.

246.
Id. at 1371 (citation omitted) (quoting City of Ontario v. Quon, 560 U.S. 746, 755
(2010)); see also Camara v. Mun. Ct. of S.F., 387 U.S. 523, 534 (1967) (holding that housing
inspections are "administrative searches" constituting "significant intrusions upon the interests
protected by the Fourth Amendment").
247.
The Court has explicitly addressed physical intrusion on effects, homes, and people and
would likely hold the same for physical papers. After all, the paradigmatic violation necessitating
the original Fourth Amendment was government agents physically rifling through the papers
of John Wilkes and others. Physical intrusion into papers would likely violate the Fourth
Amendment on a trespass theory (in addition to violating an expectation of privacy).
248.
While a little too technical, courts have found trespass searches on similarly technical
trespasses. See, e.g., Taylor v. City of Saginaw, 922 F.3 d 328, 332-36 (6th Cir. 2019) (holding that
tire chalking to determine a violation of a parking law was a Fourth Amendment search under a
Jones trespass theory, but was reasonable).
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a sensor on the road surface) is touching a Fourth Amendment effect (the
car) for the purposes of gaining information. Similarly, this reverse touch
might happen when biometrics like fingerprints or palmprints are required
to access smart devices or smart apartment buildings or workplaces. Again,
the machine would be physically touching a human being to obtain
information (biometric identification) from the person. This would be a
technical trespass search.
The formulism of this approach should strike most observers as a bit odd.
But then most observers of Justice Scalia's Jones trespass theory also thought
the trespass nature of the harm made little sense. Touching the underside of
a Jeep to affix a GPS device did not seem to be the real property, security, or
privacy harm incurred, yet that harm is exactly what the majority held was a
Fourth Amendment violation.249 Similarly, most homeowners would be hardpressed to explain the tangible harm of a trespass by a police dog on one's
porch, but that was the holding in Jardines.250 The formalism of unwanted
physical intrusion with personal or real property aligns with the unwanted
touching of a smart sidewalk trying to gain information about you.
Smart sensor technologies may also be embedded in effects or clothing
such as to raise Fourth Amendment concerns. 251 Tracking sensors such as
RFID chips or other smaller sensors are both cheap and unobtrusive, allowing
almost any object to be tagged.252 From sweaters to teddy bears, consumer
goods are regularly tracked with readable technology.253 In trespass terms, the
Fourth Amendment is triggered when the government places a sensor on the

privately owned effect with the intent to get information. For example,
affixing a smart license plate on a car, or a smart sensor on a trash can, or
connecting a smart meter to a house, would all be similar trespasses. The
search would occur when government officials affirmatively placed sensors on
the private property of citizens in a smart city (not before they purchased the
item). The ease of being able to trace a particular item may well tempt police
because the tracking value is so clear.254
Trespass searches in a smart city may be more accidental than
intentional, but because the intent is clearly to gather information the rule

249.

United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 404-11 (2012).

250.

Florida v. Jardines, 569 U.S.

1,

6-7 (2013).

251. Jill Duffy, Why Smart Clothes Still Need Work, PC MAG. (Jan. 29, 2016), https://
[https://perma.cc/UKW3-9UJ9];
www.pcmag.com/news/why-smart-clothes-still-need-work
Smart Clothing, WAREABLE, https://www.wareable.com/smart-clothing [https://perma.cc/6A6T7

BE 7 ].

252. Kevin Werbach, Sensors and Sensibilities, 28 CARDOZO L. REV. 2321, 2330-31 (2007)
(discussing RFID tagging of pets, students' backpacks, and clothes).
253.

See id.

254.
The fact that these contacts are not done in a law enforcement capacity may not matter
as much if you take the language of Grady seriously. In Grady, the Court recognized that noncriminal governmental intrusions also implicate the Fourth Amendment. See Grady v. North
Carolina, 135 S. Ct. 1368, 1370-71 (2015) (per curiam).
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becomes implicated. While I am not trying to overstate the reach of the Jones
-Jardines line of physical trespass searches, such lines may well get crossed
when building a physical city.
V.

FOURTH AMENDMENT IN THE DIGITAL CITY: EXCEPTIONS?

To make the argument

that some structural sensor systems are

unconstitutional under both existing Fourth Amendment theories means

overcoming a few objections. Perhaps, as in other special places, the rules
governing the Fourth Amendment should be different. In this argument, a
special needs exception-akin to that applied to places like airports, stadiums,
subways, schools, and border crossings-should control the analysis.
The second and perhaps more compelling objection is that though some
smart sensor surveillance constitutes a technical Fourth Amendment search,
the search is nevertheless "reasonable" under the Fourth Amendment. In

many Fourth Amendment cases, the Supreme Court has addressed only
the threshold search question and not the ultimate reasonableness of the
governmental actions. Both of these objections will be addressed in turn.
A.

SPECIAL NEEDS EXCEPTION

In evaluating Fourth Amendment protections, the Supreme Court has
recognized that place matters.55 The Fourth Amendment protections at

the border, at a school, airport, or the Super Bowl are different than other
places.25 6 The "special needs" exception has developed to allow for a different
balance between government interests and personal privacy in those areas
and for certain government activities.257
The theory behind the "special needs" exception is that certain areas or
activities or statuses require a reweighting of the normal balance of power
between governmental investigating authority and individual privacy.258 At

Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan,J., concurring) ("As the Court's
255.
opinion states, 'the Fourth Amendment protects people, not places.' The question, however, is
what protection it affords to those people. Generally, as here, the answer to that question requires
reference to a 'place."').
256.
United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 561-62, 566-67 (1976) (border);
Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 653-54, 664-65 (1995) (schools); MacWade v.
Kelly, 46o F. 3 d 260, 263 (2d Cir. 2006) (mass transit);Johnstonv. Tampa Sports Auth., 53o F.3 d
1320, 1322-26 (1ith Cir. 2008) (discussing the constitutionality of mass pat-down searches at a
professional football game under the special needs and consent exceptions to the Fourth
Amendment).
Christopher Mebane, Note, Rediscovering the Foundation of the Special Needs Exception to the
257.
Fourth Amendment in Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 4o Hous. L. REV. 177, 178 (2003).
258.
Kenneth Nuger, The Special Needs Rationale: Creating a Chasm in Fourth Amendment
Analysis, 32 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 89, 97-98 (1992) ("Since noncriminal penalties are assessed
against citizens detected in administrative searches, and since these searches are primarily
intended to advance government policy rather than to criminally punish, the Supreme Court has
had little difficulty embracing the constitutionality of administrative searches premised on
decreasing levels of suspicion.").
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these times, the government interest gets priority because the government is
not acting in its usual investigatory policing capacity. 259 For example, at the
international border, the strong governmental interest of national sovereignty
overcomes the weaker privacy interest of individual entering the country.2 60
Some warrantless searches are allowed at the border because the government
is acting to guard its sovereignty, not necessarily investigate crimes.2 61 At a
public school, the obligation of school officials to provide a safe learning
environment outweighs unfettered student privacy rights.2 6 2 School officials
are given greater latitude to search students because they are not solely acting
as criminal investigators.2 6 3 Similar rebalancing happens at airports and on
subways and other transit systems where the interests of public safety outweigh
the limits of more traditional investigation roles.2 64 Similar exceptions apply
to government activities, either because the person's status is treated
differently in some way,2 65 or because the activity puts the government in
a non-policing role.2 66 All special needs exceptions share this same reality
-there is something special about the place or activity that shifts the focus
from the normal concern about investigative police power.
The question becomes: Should smart cities be considered a special place
necessitating the use of the "special needs" exception? Are smart cities
"Fourth Amendment-free" zones? The answer is likely no for two related
reasons. First, the city-as-place is too large and undifferentiated a space to fit

259.
For example, in the government employee context the fact that the government is the
employer creates a special circumstance that warrants a different application of the Fourth
Amendment. See Timothy C. MacDonnell, The Rhetoric of the Fourth Amendment: Toward a More
PersuasiveFourth Amendment, 73 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1869, 1923 (2016) ("The 'special needs'
render the normal probable cause and warrant requirements impracticable when the
government is engaged in 'legitimate work-related, non-investigatory intrusions as well as
investigations of work-related misconduct."' (quoting O'Connor v. Ortega, 48o U.S. 709, 725
(1987))).
Robert S. Logan, Note, The Reverse Equal ProtectionAnalysis: A New Methodology for "Special
260.
Needs" Cases, 68 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 447, 484 (2000) ("Border control is another type of
important governmental interest that, in some circumstances, should give rise to a quasi-special
needs classification.").
261.
SeeUnited States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531, 538 (1985) ("[T]he Fourth
Amendment's balance of reasonableness is qualitatively different at the international border than
in the interior.").
New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 339-40 (1985) (recognizing different levels of
262.
Fourth Amendment rights in a public school setting).
263.

Id. at 3 4 1-

4

2.

264.
Alexander A. Reinert, Revisiting "SpecialNeeds" Theory via Airport Searches, 1o6 NW. U. L.
REV. 1513, 1522-26 (2012) (discussing the legal history of airport searches).
265.
Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 873-74 (1987) (probationer); O'Connor v. Ortega,
48o U.S. 709, 725 (1987) (government employee).
266.
For example, drug testing has been deemed a special needs exception. See, e.g.,
Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 658 (1995); Nat'l Treasury Emps. Union v. Von
Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 663-66 (1989); see also Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67, 75
(2001) (considering drug testing of pregnant mothers).
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neatly within the exception. Second, the police role and activities in a smart
city are not different enough to justify the exception.
In a world without any sensor-enhanced cities, one might make the
argument that the first smart city should be a special place with different
Fourth Amendment rules. Compared to every other city in America, the area

would seem special enough. But that argument misconceives the justification
for the special needs exception. The special places are not simply different
places than the rest of the world around them, but are places involved
in particular activities that warrant less privacy protection because of other
non-law-enforcement interests at play.2 67 A smart city may have those places
(schools, stadiums, subways), but also has every other place that a normal city
does. Excepting out the entire city as special would make little sense. Instead,
a smart city may replicate "special" places with more data collection in some
places than others.2 68
Further, the special needs rationale does not comport with the
relationship between police and citizens in a smart city. Police and citizens in
such a city are not in any different relationship necessitating a special needs
exception. When police are investigating crime in a smart city, they are
investigating crime. Their role does not change just because it is happening
with digital means. Whereas the special needs exception was created for
government agents playing non-investigative roles (which will also happen in
a smart city), as a general matter police will be playing the same role in both
types of cities. It is not that special needs do not exist in the smart city, but
they do not exist in any different way than a traditional city. Areas, activities,
and statuses will give rise to special considerations, but not because they arise
in a smart city. Smart cities might be special, but they do not create a
generalized city-wide special needs exception.
B.

REASONABLENESS

The Supreme Court has written that the "touchstone of the
Fourth Amendment is 'reasonableness,"' putting great emphasis on the
"unreasonable" language in the Fourth Amendment.2 6 9 Though much of
the debate in this Article (and the case law) draws the threshold line of
when a government action becomes a Fourth Amendment "search," the

267. Joseph S. Dowdy, Well Isn't That Special? The Supreme Court's Immediate Purposeof Restricting
the Doctrine of Special Needs in Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 8o N.C. L. REV. 1050, 1055-56
(2002) ("Special needs exist where the privacy interests implicated by the search are minimal,
and where the requirement of individualized suspicion places some important governmental
interest injeopardy." (footnotes omitted)).
268.

The puzzle of special needs areas in a smart city may warrant its own separate article.

269.
Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2482 (2014) (quoting Brigham City v. Stuart, 547
U.S. 398, 403 (2006)); see id. ("Our cases have determined that '[w]here a search is undertaken
by law enforcement officials to discover evidence of criminal wrongdoing, . . . reasonableness
generally requires the obtaining of ajudicial warrant."' (alterations in original) (quoting Vernonia
Sch. Dist., 515 U.S. at 653)).
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reasonableness analysis asks whether searches without a warrant might still be
constitutional under certain circumstances. For example, in the Jones GPS
case, the Court's entire discussion focused on whether the attachment of a
GPS device was a Fourth Amendment "search," and not whether this search
was reasonable (and thus still constitutional).270
The debate over the relationship between the warrant requirement and
reasonableness has long engaged Supreme Court Justices.271 If interpreted
broadly, reasonableness provides a work-around to the limitations imposed by
the warrant requirement, as all evidence would be admitted if deemed
reasonable (even if obtained without a probable cause warrant). Thus, the
argument has offered those conservative Justices critical of the current
threshold "search" tests a way around the doctrine.272
Here, the question is whether the collection of smart sensor data is
nevertheless "reasonable" because the information is being collected for nonlaw-enforcement purposes. The Seventh Circuit decided its Naperville case on
smart electricity readers in homes along those lines.273 There, the court held
that collection of the municipal smart meter data from the home was a Fourth
Amendment "search" after Carpenter, but that the collection was reasonable
under the Fourth Amendment.274 The Seventh Circuit determined that
because the smart meters were installed solely for electrical grid improvement
and not for criminal investigation, the collection of electrical data was
reasonable.275 The Seventh Circuit applied the Supreme Court's
reasonableness test, assessing reasonableness "by balancing its intrusion on
the individual's Fourth Amendment interests against its promotion of

270.
The Supreme Court explicitly acknowledged that they were not deciding the
reasonableness issue because it had not been raised by the government. United States v. Jones,
565 U.S. 400, 413 (2012).
271.
See, e.g., California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 582 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring in
judgment) ("Although the Fourth Amendment does not explicitly impose the requirement of a
warrant, it is of course textually possible to consider that implicit within the requirement of
reasonableness. For some years after the (still continuing) explosion in Fourth Amendment
litigation that followed our announcement of the exclusionary rule in Weeks v. United States, our
jurisprudence lurched back and forth between imposing a categorical warrant requirement and
looking to reasonableness alone." (citation omitted)).
272.
Kathleen M. Sullivan, Foreword: Thefustices ofRules and Standards, 106 HARV. L. REV. 22,
98-99 (1992) ("[W]hen liberals win using rules, conservatives want balancing-as in the shift in
Fourth Amendment law from the fixed requirements of a warrant or particularized cause to the
ever-expanding substitution of multi-factored 'reasonableness' tests for searches and seizures
instead."). Generally speaking, however, the current understanding is that when government
officials are acting in an investigatory capacity, ajudicial probable cause warrant is necessary, but
when officials are acting in a non-investigative capacity courts apply a balancing of interests.
Naperville Smart Meter Awareness v. City of Naperville, goo F.3 d 521, 528 ( 7 th Cir. 2018).

274.

Id. at 5 2 7 -2 9

.

273.

275.
Id. at 529 ("Smart meters allow utilities to reduce costs, provide cheaper power to
consumers, encourage energy efficiency, and increase grid stability. We hold that these interests
render the city's search reasonable, where the search is unrelated to law enforcement, is
minimally invasive, and presents little risk of corollary criminal consequences.").
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legitimate governmental interests."27 6 In the electricity monitoring situation,

the intrusion of collecting home energy levels was minimal, and the need for
a smarter electrical grid was strong. On balance, the court determined that
the equities favored the government.
Applied broadly to the smart city context, the questions would be:
(1) whether the wholesale collection of smart data could be deemed
reasonable because the information was not generated primarily for law
enforcement reasons; and (2) whether on balance the intrusion of large-scale
data collection favors legitimate government interests.
First, as a baseline, the Fourth Amendment protections have never been

solely about protection from law enforcement as opposed to general
government intrusion. 277 Numerous cases refuse to draw neat lines between
government investigation and police investigation.278 After all, the Fourth
Amendment is a check on general governmental power, not just specific
police power.
That said, when the government acts with a non-law-enforcement focus
the Supreme Court has on occasion changed the analysis. The issue becomes
whether there is a non-law-enforcement justification for the search which
requires a different reasonableness balancing. The answer for a smart city
is "maybe." One could design a smart city to avoid sharing data with law
enforcement. One could create mechanisms to blind officers from being able
to access the collected data. A smart city government that consciously cut off
data access to law enforcement (absent a warrant) might be much more likely
to survive constitutional challenge. Similarly, intentional decisions to collect
data only for non-law-enforcement purposes might strengthen the
government's defense about the purpose of collection. Though purpose
alone cannot control the reasonableness analysis and a non-law-enforcement
goal does not avoid all Fourth Amendment problems, these types of
intentional choices about how to protect or minimize data might be critical
for a city to claim the smart collection was reasonable.

276.

Id. at 528 (quoting Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 654 (1979)).
277.
As the Supreme Court recognized in Weeks, the Fourth Amendment applies to all
government actors, not just police or law enforcement actors. Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S.
383, 391-92 (1914), overruled by Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961) ("The effect of the Fourth
Amendment is to put the courts of the United States and Federal officials, in the exercise of their
power and authority, under limitations and restraints as to the exercise of such power and
authority, and to forever secure the people, their persons, houses, papers and effects against all
unreasonable searches and seizures under the guise of law. This protection reaches all alike,
whether accused of crime or not, and the duty of giving to it force and effect is obligatory upon
all entrusted under our Federal system with the enforcement of the laws.").
278.
See Grady v. North Carolina, 135 S. Ct. 1368, 1371 (2015) ("'It is well settled,' however,
'that the Fourth Amendment's protection extends beyond the sphere of criminal
investigations."'(quoting City of Ontario, Cal. v. Quor, 56o U.S. 746, 755 (2010))); Camara v.
Mun. Ct. of S.F., 387 U.S. 523, 533 (1967).
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The key is establishing that the relationship between smart data
collection and law enforcement monitoring remains separate and distinct.279
Without specific memorandums of understanding or laws that forbid law
enforcement access to city data, the default will likely be that police can obtain
it like any other city information. In fact, because many cities will be designed
to enhance public safety and because of the attraction of big data surveillance
technologies, it would be odd for police not to have direct access to many of
the data feeds. As will be discussed in Part VI, the data-sharing arrangement
need not be set up this way, but without clear legal limits on police acquisition
of smart data, it seems likely that police will have access.
The second big question is how a court would balance the government
interests of data collection against individual privacy interests. As discussed in
Part II, the potential privacy invasion in smart cities is at a scale never seen
before, and the capacity to obtain granular data about individuals is
unprecedented. Further, the government interest in obtaining the
information is not terribly urgent. The need is ongoing and continuous, but
usually not any sort of exigency. Though the whole point of a smart city is
massive data collection, this does not necessarily translate into an automatic
prioritizing of governmental access to all of that data over privacy interests.
Any deference to government interests for particular governmental needs
must confront the reality that the balancing rationale may not make sense at
scale (with multiple overlapping sensor systems at issue). It is one thing to
balance a particular surveillance tactic, or a special type of administrative
inspection, or even a type of municipal efficiency; it is another thing to
balance a collection of such tactics, inspection, and services that span an
entire city and are all possibly aggregated. With city-wide mass surveillance,
any individualized reasonableness balancing determination becomes quite
difficult.
Both parts of the reasonableness analysis-purpose and balancing-can
be made easier to analyze if smart city designers are intentional about the
legal rules that govern the city. As will be discussed in the next Part, the
choices made to draft legal protections into the blueprints of smart city design
might be critically important not only to protecting privacy and security, and
furthering innovation, but also to surviving a Fourth Amendment challenge
that a smart city is unconstitutional.
VI. A DIGITAL PRIVACY-FOCUSED POSITIVE LAW

Some

structural

sensor

surveillance

likely

violates

the

Fourth

Amendment, which may reflect more on the limits of the Fourth Amendment

than the new technologies. This Part describes how a smart city might design
itself out of the confusion that is the Fourth Amendment search doctrine.
This Part takes the insight that design choices can alter Fourth Amendment

279.

See supra note 278 and accompanying text.
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protections and expand them, proactively addressing privacy design and thus
constitutional design.
Two considerations play a central role in this reimagining of Fourth
Amendment protections. First, digital rights can be built into the municipal
code of a smart city, regulating data collection, use, and sharing. Second,
Privacy by Design28o principles that inform the technical engineering of smart
devices, networks, and cities provide a framework for establishing normative
expectations of privacy. Neither of these theories is new, but as applied to
smart sensors, they offer concrete solutions to the data privacy puzzle. Because
smart city infrastructure would be designed from scratch, unlike traditional ex
post analyses of reasonable expectations of privacy, one can ex ante design these
Fourth Amendment expectations and data rules from the outset and across
the entire city. By designing a "legal layer"2 8 1 into the architecture of a smart
city, planners can shape citizens' Fourth Amendment expectations.
To be clear, the ultimate Fourth Amendment determination will be made

by judges with an obligation to interpret the U.S. Constitution.2 8 2 Statutory or
other law cannot replace the constitutional floor, but it can inform it and raise
privacy protections above that floor so the Fourth Amendment question
becomes less significant.2 83 A digital positive law would offer guideposts for
courts attempting traditional analysis of the constitutionality of a particular
law enforcement action.

This insight that positive law might clarify the Fourth Amendment search
doctrine finds support in Justice Gorsuch's Carpenterdissent, which discusses
a positive law approach to the Fourth Amendment.2 84 The argument-itself
inspired by William Baude and James Stern's article The Positive Law Model of

280.

See generally ANN CAVOUKIAN, INFO. & PRIV. COMM'R OF ONT., PRIVACY BY DESIGN: THE

7 FOUNDATIONAL PRINCIPLES (Jan. 201 i)

[hereinafter CAVOUKIAN, FOUNDATIONAL PRINCIPLES],

https://iapp.org/media/pdf/resourcecenter/pbd_implemeit_7found_principles.pdf
[https://
perma.cc/ 7 VR 5 -WYGP] (describing seven information management principles that enhance
information privacy).
281.

See infra Section VLE.

282.
U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 ("This Constitution ... shall be the supreme Law of the Land;
and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of
any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.").
283.
Marc L. Miller & Ronald F. Wright, Leaky Floors: State Law Below Federal Constitutional
Limits, 5 o ARIZ. L. REV. 227, 228 (2008) ("One of the most widely accepted notions in American
constitutional law is that the federal Constitution and interpretations of that Constitution by the
Supreme Court of the United States set a 'floor' for personal liberties. State courts and state
legislatures cannot properly go below the federal floor."). Professors Miller and Wright critique
this claim as being overbroad and inexact, but the claim still holds as a general assertion.
284.

Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2270 (2018)

(Gorsuch,

J.,

dissenting)

("[P] ositive law may help provide detailed guidance on evolving technologies without resort to
judicial intuition. State (or sometimes federal) law often creates rights in both tangible and
intangible things.").
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the Fourth Amendment25-becomes even more useful when one can create a
digital positive law from scratch. I argue that smart cities can establish a digital
positive law floor that will set forth the Fourth Amendment parameters of
privacy and security for both private actors and the government in a way that
is more protective than the current standard. My argument is not that data
rights should be converted into property rights, because without a privacy or
human rights framework, property rights do not adequately protect data.
Instead, I argue that positive law-which can grant data control and digital
rights-in addition to technological choices might offer more protection.
This Part proceeds in five Sections. The first Section looks at the contours
of Justice Gorsuch's Fourth Amendment theory of positive law as a source of
constitutional framing. The second Section looks at data property and control
laws that can be repurposed to create enforceable data rights, the interference
with which would constitute a Fourth Amendment search. The third
Section examines various positive law approaches separate from a pure
property-focused framework. The fourth Section examines how the Fourth
Amendment expectation of privacy threshold can be established through
digital design principles. These principles, which create enforceable
expectations of privacy, can be written into law at the outset. Finally, the fifth
Section proposes the construction of a "legal layer" mapped on top of the
digital layer that connects city sensors. This legal layer will govern, node by
node, what happens to the collected sensor data in a smart city network. The
result will be a smart city with Fourth Amendment protections enforced
through municipal and computer code.
A.

THE POSITIVE LAW MODEL

Justice Gorsuch's Carpenterdissent critiqued the existing theories of the
Fourth Amendment, hinting that he was looking for another framework to
address the doctrine in a digital age.2 86 Though not adopting a positive law
approach, he suggested one might offer a promising option worth exploring
in a future case.
As an initial matter, Justice Gorsuch noted that positive law has always
influenced the Fourth Amendment: "From the founding until the 1 g6os, the
right to assert a Fourth Amendment claim didn't depend on your ability to
appeal to a judge's personal sensibilities about the 'reasonableness' of your
expectations or privacy. It was tied to the law."2 8 7 Legal rules promulgated by

285.
William Baude & James Y. Stern, The Positive Law Model of the Fourth Amendment,
HARV. L. REV. 1821, 1825-26 (2016).
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286.
Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2267 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting) (looking for "another way" to
answer the Fourth Amendment issues brought on by new technology).
Id.; see also United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 407-08 (2012) ("We have embodied
287.
that preservation of past rights in our very definition of 'reasonable expectation of privacy' which
we have said to be an expectation 'that has a source outside of the Fourth Amendment, either by
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duly constituted legislatures offered, he suggested, a form of clarity, thus
allowing judges an easier time interpreting Fourth Amendment violations
without resorting to more subjective sensibilities as to assumed societal
expectations.2 88 Judges are, after all, more practiced at interpreting written
law and less adept at judging societal norms. The appeal to an established
written law was also, he claimed, more democratic,2 8 9 and thus (theoretically)
more responsive to public will.290 Finally, the positive law could adapt-both
to technology and changed circumstances-allowing greater flexibility. For
example, one could draft laws about data ownership and data control,
or mandate certain privacy protections, or create fiduciary or bailee
relationships through legislative rules.291 These rules need not even be
statutory if there were a clear customary norm of a particular legal rule. To
Justice Gorsuch, the appeal of positive law rested on this mixture of history,
utility, legitimacy, and pragmatism.292
In his Carpenter dissent, Justice Gorsuch did not commit to a general
positive law approach for the Fourth Amendment, but he did provide some
useful clues to creating a digital positive law for personal data. For example,
Justice Gorsuch noted that federal and state law "defin[es] '[p]roperty' to
include 'property held in any digital or electronic medium."'293 Digital
information could be considered property if explicitly written into the law. In
addition,Justice Gorsuch read the telecommunications law governing cell-site

reference to concepts of real or personal property law or to understandings that are recognized
and permitted by society."' (quoting Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83, 88 (1998))).
288.
But seeWayne A. Logan, FourthAmendment Localism, 93 IND. L.J. 369, 372 (2018) (asking
whether Fourth Amendment norms should be localized).
Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2268 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting) ("Beyond its provenance in the
289.
text and original understanding of the Amendment, this traditional approach comes with other
advantages. Judges are supposed to decide cases based on 'democratically legitimate sources of
law'-like positive law or analogies to items protected by the enacted Constitution-rather than
'their own biases or personal policy preferences."' (quoting Todd E. Pettys, JudicialDiscretion in
ConstitutionalCases, 26J.L. &POL. 123, 127 (2011))).

ego. Id. ("A Fourth Amendment model based on positive legal rights 'carves out significant
room for legislative participation in the Fourth Amendment context,' too, by asking judges to
consult what the people's representatives have to say about their rights." (quoting Baude & Stern,
supra note 285, at 1852)).
291.

See DANIEL

J.

SOLOVE, THE

DIGITAL PERSON: TECHNOLOGY AND PRIVACY IN THE

INFORMATION AGE 103 (2004); Kiel Brennan-Marquez, Fourth Amendment Fiduciaries, 84
FORDHAM L. REV. 611, 614-16 (2015);Jay P. Kesan & Carol M. Hayes, LiabilityforData Injuries,
2019 U. ILL. L. REV. 295, 356 ("If there is a bailment relationship, this implies that data
holders have a duty to secure data in a manner analogous to how bailees protect tangible
property.").
292.

See supranotes 286-88 and accompanying text.

293.

Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2270 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting) (quoting TEX. PROP. CODE ANN.
(West 2017)) ("A similar inquiry may be appropriate for the Fourth Amendment.
Both the States and federal government are actively legislating in the area of third party data
storage and the rights users enjoy." (citing Stored Communications Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2712
(2018))).
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data as potentially creating a property right in the data akin to digital papers
or effects: "It seems to me entirely possible a person's cell-site data could
qualify as his papers or effects under existing law."294
Both examples show how statutory law could create enforceable property
rights if drafted correctly. If the positive law explicitly granted property rights
and control over the data, interference with the digital property could be
considered a Fourth Amendment search.295 Despite the theoretical opening,
Justice Gorsuch left any conclusion about these particular arguments for
a future day because the record was insufficiently developed for further
analysis.29 6 At least for the cell-site locational data at issue in Carpenter,Justice
Gorsuch was not willing to follow a positive law approach.
Unlike a Supreme Court Justice who must look backwards to divine
whether a statutory law explicitly created a positive law expectation in a
specific case, urban planners in a smart city could design these "data as
property" protections from the outset. And, once established in the law, any
interference with this property interest without a warrant could be subject to
Fourth Amendment limitations. Note also that Justice Gorsuch's connection
of property rights and positive law is just one possible option for positive law
rules. Positive law can also create rules about control, deletion, rights,
autonomy, and other non-property-based protections.
The next three Sections briefly explore how a smart city might think
about creating a digital positive law for municipal data.
B.

DIGITAL PROPERTY: FOURTH AMENDMENT PROTECTIONS
THROUGH PROPERTY RIGHTS

In many legal contexts, data is property.297 Entire industries now exist to
collect and sell personal data. In the smart city context, the city designers
know that certain types of data will be collected as a matter of course.298 So,
for example, the locational systems that track people through a city API via
their smart devices could be (and likely will be) monetized to sell advertising
294.

Id. at 22 7 2.

295.
See Baude & Stern, supra note 285, at 1873-74; Susan W. Brenner, Fourth Amendment
Future: Remote Computer Searches and the Use of Virtual Force, 81 MIss. L.J. 1229, 1244-46 (2012);
Paul Ohm, The Olnsteadian Seizure Clause: The Fourth Amendment and the Seizure of Intangible
Property, 2oo8 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 2, 3.
296.
Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2272 (Gorsuch,J., dissenting) ("The problem is that we do not
know anything more. Before the district court and court of appeals, Mr. Carpenter pursued only
a Katz 'reasonable expectations' argument. . . . Even in his merits brief before this Court, Mr.
Carpenter's discussion of his positive law rights in cell-site data was cursory.... In these
circumstances, I cannot help but conclude-reluctantly-that Mr. Carpenter forfeited perhaps
his most promising line of argument.").
See generallyJOSHUA A.T. FAIRFIELD, OWNED: PROPERTY, PRIVACY, AND THE NEW DIGITAL
297.
SERFDOM (2017) (discussing the law around intellectual property of data).

298.
Ava Kofman, Google's Sidewalk Labs Plans to Package and Sell Location Data on Millions of
Cellphones, INTERCEPT (Jan. 28, 2019, 7:05 AM), https://theiitercept.com/2o 19/o1 /28/googlealphabet-sidewalk-labs-replica-cellphone-data [https://perma.cc/ 4 QGN-JZUY].
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or other goods.299 The data is valuable, but can also be protected. Data can
be turned into a property right via law and protected from commercial
acquisition without specific legal authorization.
Municipalities, having a role in city data collection, may be able to write
laws that are protective of this information. So, for example, whereas the
ordinary consumer and company contractual agreement over data might not
protect the consumer at all, a municipal smart city government could rewrite
that protection to explicitly grant a property right (or the right to control the
data). In smart cities, the data rules can be precise and regulated ex ante.
Through municipal code, a city could establish who owns data at every smart
city collection point.
The reason why such a digital positive law might matter in the Fourth
Amendment context is that by putting the data property rules in municipal
law, a smart city can establish a threshold privacy-property line for a search.soo
Just like a law that says entering the curtilage of a home is burglary or taking
personal property is an interference with chattel, so laws can be written to
protect data from acquisition. If digital positive law grants a property right in
smart city data and if the data is acquired without a duly authorized warrant,
it would make it a Fourth Amendment search (absent an exception) .so1 Such
a positive law approach might be unwieldy in an already established urban
environment with existing property laws and norms that vary by jurisdiction.
But when you are designing the smart city from scratch, you can write the
rules at the creation.

In practical effect, this means that a smart city's municipal body would
need to think through the data ownership rules at the front end and write the
ownership agreements into law. This would be a shift from the current
company-consumer agreements that dominate data ownership in the United
States. As but one example, the current data relationship with the free
LinkNYC Wi-Fi kiosks in New York City offers a fairly standard trade off: In
return for free Wi-Fi, city residents provide personal data to use the "free"
service.02 A smart city could rewrite the data relationship at the front end. A
city could pass a law that residents own the data going into the Wi-Fi kiosk and

egg.

Valentino-DeVries et al., supranote 77; Summers, supranote 50.
3oo.
But courts would still determine final Fourth Amendment interpretation. See supranote
282 and accompanying text.
301.
The statutory rule might also obviate the need for many Fourth Amendment battles
because the matter could be resolved as a statutory, non-constitutional matter.
302.
Arman Tabatabai, The Economics and Trade-Offs of Ad-Funded Smart City Tech,
TECHCRUNCH (Dec. 1, 2018, i1:oo AM), https://techcrunch.com/2o18/12/o i/the-economicsand-tradeoffs-of-ad-funded-smart-city-tech
[https://perma.cc/NNgD-4EWW]; Kaveh Waddell,
Will New York City's Free Wi-Fi Help Police Watch You?, ATLANTIC (Apr. 11, 2016), https://
www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/ 2016/o4/linknyc-ew-york-wifi-privacy-security/477696

[https://perma.cc/ZM 4 G-BEC6].
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retain a property interest in the information.o3 If a police detective should
seek to gain access to this digital property without a duly authorized warrant,
it would be considered a search for Fourth Amendment purposes because the
law granted a clear property interest in the data with which the police officer
has now interfered.04 The digital positive law establishing ownership would
be explicit in the statute, and the police detective's access of the information
would be a search under this positive law theory. Similar data ownership laws
could be written for electrical use, trash, smart cars, smart phones, etc. The
point is that because engineers design and build the system from the front
end, they can establish the rules of when a search occurs.
Property-based rights protections, of course, have serious limitations
because digital property is easily bargained away, and the power dynamics of
the interaction remain starkly imbalanced. The surveillance capitalism
economy that has monetized data demonstrates that individual choices over
data do not result in much protection at all.305 A pure property-based positive
law around data will likely mirror similar economic and social imbalances and
create significant and unfair power imbalances. In fact, personal data might
become the extractive raw materials for a data-driven economy, but one that
does not equally share the value. As long as economically powerful technology
companies control access, individual property rights will not be properly
valued or balanced. This imbalance will be especially true when the data being
negotiated involves necessary public goods like municipal services.
C.

POSITIVE LAW: FOURTHAMENDMENT PROTECTIONS THROUGHLAW

Positive law need not be property-based. Positive law involves rules
directed against private parties.0 6 One could, consistent with current positive
law theories, shape data expectations through formal legal rules. As a recent
example, the California Consumer Privacy Act reshaped data rights for
individuals living in California37 as did the General Data Protection

303.
As one example, Sidewalk Labs had proposed the creation of a civic data trust to avoid
the problems of monetizing public data. A civic trust would control the public data and regulate
its dissemination so as not to simply allow private companies to monetize it. See SIDEWALK LABS,
supra note 105, at i 1-16.
In many ways this is what Justice Gorsuch was exploring with his discussion of the
304.
property rights in the Stored Communications Act. See Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct.
2206, 2270 (2o18) (Gorsuch, J., dissenting).
305.

See generally SHOSHANA ZUBOFF, THE AGE OF SURVEILLANCE CAPITALISM: THE FIGHT FOR

A HUMAN FUTURE AT THE NEW FRONTIER OF POWER (2019) (exploring the impacts of surveillance
capitalism).
306.
Baude & Stern, supra note 285, at 1825 ("Instead of making Fourth Amendment
protection hinge on whether it is 'reasonable' to expect privacy in a given situation, a court
should ask whether government officials have engaged in an investigative act that would be
unlawful for a similarly situated private actor to perform. That is, stripped of official authority,
has the government actor done something that would be tortious, criminal, or otherwise a
violation of some legal duty?").
307.

CAL. CIv. CODE §§ 1798.100-1798.192 (West 2o19).
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Regulation's approach to data control in Europe.30 8 Though workings of both
laws are beyond the scope of this Article, they offer examples of how such data
protective laws can reshape expectations of data privacy through positive
law.309
To be clear, positive law need not be the adoption of the Baude and Stern
"positive law theory," which looks to violations of private law to interpret
whether government action violates the Fourth Amendment.3

In fact, a

better framework might be based on Professor Richard Re's insightful critique
of the Baude and Stern article and his proposal to establish a "positive law
floor."11 As Professor Re suggests:
Whereas the positive law model would treat laws directed toward
private parties as a hard ceiling on the meaning of the word "search,"
my suggestion is that courts might treat privacy laws directed toward
private parties as a presumptive floor on the Fourth Amendment's
prohibition against "unreasonable searches." On this view, when
lawmakers guard against privacy intrusions by private parties, then
similar intrusions by the government would be presumptively
unreasonable.312
In other words, the legislative choice to restrict private data collection in smart
cities would provide powerful evidence that those limitations also restrict
governmental collection of that data. Legislative action would inform what
would be considered a reasonable government action by regulating private
data collection. And again, because this positive law would be created at the
outset to govern both private and government data collection, the legal
expectations could be made more transparent.
Of course, there are real limitations of what Professor Wayne Logan calls
"Fourth Amendment localism."313 Any positive law will necessarily be localized
to a place which can add significant complications to the analysis beyond that
particular city.3'4 One smart city might design legal protections different from
another, and the influence of corporate power on such decisions could be
quite substantial, if not dangerous. Writing municipal laws to govern privacy
-especially with assistance of technology companies and engineers-may not

308.
See generally Council Regulation 2016/679, 2016
individuals' rights in regard to their data).

O.J.

(L 119) (EU)

(establishing

309.
See, e.g., Nicholas F. Palmieri III, Who Should Regulate Data?:An Analysis of the California
Consumer Privacy Act and Its Effects on Nationwide Data Protection Laws, 1 1 HASTINGS SCI. & TECH.
L.J. 37, 59 (2020); Margot E. Kaminski, Binary Governance: Lessons from the GDPR's Approach to
Algorithmic Accountability, 92 S. CAL. L. REV. 1529, 1583-86 (2o19).
310.
Michael J. Zydney Mannheimer, DecentralizingFourth Amendment Search Doctrine, 107 KY.
L.J. 169, 211 (2018-2019).
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Richard M. Re, The PositiveLaw Floor, 129 HARV. L. REV. F. 313, 332-37 (2016).
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Logan, supra note 288, at 372-76 (challenging the Fourth Amendment localism model).
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necessarily reflect the interests of all community members. Fraught issues
must be addressed: who holds political power, concerns about the
marginalization of disadvantaged communities, structural economic
incentives, and a whole host of socio-economic realities involving capacity,
democratic engagement, and knowledge.
Yet this type of rethinking about how to design legal protections around
surveillance technologies has already begun. Professors David Gray and
Danielle Citron have suggested a "technology-centered approach" to
determine which types of surveillance count as a Fourth Amendment
search.315 The proposed test-which arguably influenced the majority in
Carpenter-would mark any surveillance technology a search if it "has the
capacity to facilitate broad programs of indiscriminate surveillance that raise
the specter of a surveillance state if deployment and use of that technology is
left to the unfettered discretion of government."3

6

For smart sensors, the

technology-centered approach would classify much of the surveillance
architecture as a Fourth Amendment problem.
But answering this threshold question does not resolve how smart cities
should address the choices in new technologies. In his book, The Fourth
Amendment in an Age of Surveillance, Professor Gray undertakes to build out
some of this Fourth Amendment scaffolding.317 He suggests designing legal
constraints around the eight operational stages of big data collection:
(1) deployment; (2) data gathering; (3) data aggregation; (4) data storage;
(5) data access; (6) data analytics; (7) accessing the results of data analytics;
and (8) uses of data analytics.31S In his book, Gray applies each stage to a series
of technologies, including many which will make an appearance in a smart
city. The point is that this type of structured legal and technological analysis
at each moment of data collection can be accomplished. In the same way
computer science engineers must make decisions about possible outcomes
based on possible inputs, challenges, and changes, so must the lawyers. Step
by step, collection point by collection point, the moments of data collection
can be regulated at the outset.
D.

DIGITAL PRIVACY RIGHTS: FOURTH AMENDMENT EXPECTATIONS
THROUGH COMPUTER CODE

In addition to legal code, one can also create expectations of privacy
through computer code. Privacy experts and scholars have expended
considerable thought to creating privacy frameworks under the concept of

David Gray & Danielle Citron, The Right to QuantitativePrivacy, 98 MINN. L. REV. 62, 101
315.
-03 (2013).
316.
Id. at 1o1. See generally Susan Freiwald, First Principles of Communications Privacy, 2007
STAN. TECH. L. REV. 3 (providing, arguably, the intellectual framework for the majority's test in
Carpenter).
317.

DAVID GRAY, THE FOURTH AMENDMENT IN AN AGE OF SURVEILLANCE 267-74 (2017).

318.

Id.
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"Privacy by Design" and other related frameworks.319 The idea, in brief, is that
privacy principles can be embedded in technology to restrict the flow of
personal information.30 Intentionally designing the technology to default
toward privacy, anonymize data, and restrict access can strengthen overall
privacy.32
As an example of how Privacy by Design might work with smart sensors,
take the innovation of smart meters which collect energy readings from
homes. As discussed earlier in the Seventh Circuit case involving energy
meters as proof of criminal activity,322 these types of data collection systems
can reveal incriminating evidence from the home. In a "Privacy by Design"influenced city, however, a smart energy grid can be engineered to not collect
any personally-identifying information. In fact, in a white paper entitled
OperationalizingPrivacy by Design: The Ontario Smart Grid Case Study, Dr.
Cavoukian and her team demonstrate how the different data sources can be
siloed and anonymized so as not to reveal personal information.323 Essentially,
the researchers offer a technical privacy fix to a complex but common city
problem.
More specifically, in Ontario, the key was to organize information flows
in separate "domains" with personal privacy protection around each domain.
In this context, a domain is a separate data circuit that is not connected to
others. In the Ontario smart grid example, designers suggest a domain
around the home so individual customers can control the information shared
2
The goal is to remove all
about smart appliances and other energy use.3%

See generally CAVOUKIAN, FOUNDATIONAL PRINCIPLES, supra note 280 (explaining seven
319.
principles of information management); ANN CAVOUKIAN, INFO. & PRIV. COMM'R OF ONT.,
OPERATIONALIZING PRIVACY BY DESIGN: A GUIDE TO IMPLEMENTING STRONG PRIVACY PRACTICES

(Dec. 2012) [hereinafter CAVOUKIAN, IMPLEMENTATION GUIDE], https://collectiois.ola.org/
mor/26o12/320221.pdf [https://perma.cc/F 7 AR- 7 MNJ] (discussing how to implement
information management principles).
320.

See sources cited supra note 319.
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the development of Ontario's Smart Grid and related privacy issues).
324.

INFO. & PRIV. COMM'R OF ONT., CASE STUDY, supra note 323, at 7.

IOWA LAWREVIEW

110

[Vol. 10o6:47

personally-identifying information on the home devices, separating out this
first domain from any services that the electrical company might offer.325 They
suggest a second, separate domain for services which would include customer
data for billing purposes, in which particularized information about a home
would be kept, but also aggregated with other home data retaining a measure
of customer anonymity.3 6 Finally, engineers suggest a third domain for the
larger grid to monitor the large-scale use of electricity across ajurisdiction.327
This grid domain will not have any connection with the other two. The three
domains are separate and the consumer data in one cannot be linked to the
others, offering some measure of privacy about individual home electricity
use.32 8 This type of purposeful privacy protective action can be embedded in
all sorts of smart city technology-so long as data privacy is emphasized at the
beginning.329
Professor Woodrow Hartzog has gone one step further to sketch out the
blueprints for smart technologies designed for privacy. In his book Privacy's
Blueprint: The Battle to Control the Design of New Technologies, Hartzog offers
suggestions on how to design technologies conscious of the legal and
regulatory frameworks in which they exist.33 His argument is that by
consciously focusing on design-how we interact and connect with new
technologies-we can change conceptions of privacy, trust, and develop legal
rules to protect that privacy or obscurity that we need for a functioning
democracy.331 Professor Hartzog's argument is that design choices (interfaces,
buttons, prompts) can directly control use and thus expectations of privacy.332
If we imagine smart sensors in a smart city as merely a collection of such
technologies, then how we design the human interface will have a direct
consequence on privacy. Professor Hartzog demonstrates how every
infringement by technology is really a design problem, and that the key to
shaping privacy is to think through those design issues at the front end of
creation.333
For Fourth Amendment purposes, this type of intentional design focus is
not only protective of data privacy, but helps establish reasonable expectations
of privacy. If the question is whether an individual has a reasonable
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Id. at 8.
Id. at 7-9.
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Id. at 7, 10.
Id. at ii.

329.

See Hiller & Blanke, supranote 9, at 336-37.
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Id. Though beyond the scope of this Article, Professor Hartzog tackles some of the smart
333.
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eye toward privacy. Id.
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expectation of privacy in their smart home connected to a smart grid, the
design principles embedded in the code or the grid may suggest the answer.
Thus, even if the police somehow circumvent the privacy controls (via the
home or electrical company), the law-as established by the computer coded
norms-would govern the expectation of privacy analysis. A judge does not
have to guess about reasonable societal expectations because the default
computer code sets the rule. Acquisition of smart grid data that runs into a
Privacy by Design default or automatic deletion of data rule or intentional silo
would be a Fourth Amendment issue. In other words, the existing privacy
protections programmed into the technology will influence the legal analysis.
Whether we are talking about electricity, trash, cars, or other smart devices,
design can change constitutional protections-so long as it is built with
privacy in mind.
E.

DESIGNING THE "LEGAL LAYER"

A truly smart city will require a "legal layer" to be built on top of the
digital layer already built into the physical infrastructure. This legal layer can
be envisioned as a legal blueprint that maps directly onto the digital layer,
node for node, sensor by sensor. Every sensor node of digital collection will
have a legal judgment about the use, access, retention, expectations, and
security of data to go along with it. This legal layer will address Fourth
Amendment privacy and security protections, but also embrace other
statutory or regulatory protections (including those that encapsulate rules
regarding use of health data, personal data, financial data, etc.). This legal
layer will be reflected in the technological design and protected by code. And
just as a team of engineers will design the smart city for optimal performance,
a team of lawyers will design smart laws within Fourth Amendment
constraints. Building off the theoretical and practical insights of scholars,
civil rights advocates, and engineers, this legal layer will embed a proactive
approach to digital management of personal information.334
The imagination that has spurred smart cities' design can extend to alter
the legal landscape. If technology innovators-with the vision to reimagine a
city's built environment-are also invested in developing legal, ethical, and
technological rules to protect privacy at the outset, many of the Fourth
Amendment problems could be minimized. New visions of how to rethink
privacy and security protections through a legal layer are possible and could
help re-engineer the future of the Fourth Amendment. The goal, however,

must be to design the city structure and legal structures wisely in parallel with
the digital layer. The challenge for the future is to bring together legal

Building a smart city without a legal layer is a design flaw that not only will raise Fourth
334.
Amendment concerns (if the arguments in this paper are convincing), but will raise a whole host
of avoidable problems. A legal layer will be the only way to proactively respond to criticisms that
a smart city is really just a city of surveillance or data capitalism or both.
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scholars, technologists, ethicists, companies, and impacted communities to
start designing the legal layer before the municipal blueprints are finalized.
VII. CONCLUSION

This Article attempts to initiate a conversation about the Fourth
Amendment's future, using smart sensor infrastructure as a heuristic for the
very real technological change coming. The Article offers a warning and a
path forward, but the real work-as with any good innovation-will be in the
design process. Law, code, and design principles must be created with a vision
of the type of privacy, security, and autonomy citizens will want in a smart city.
These decisions will not only shape the physical architecture of where we walk,
work, and play, but will shape the architecture of privacy for all those who live
in and interact with a smart city. Such decisions will also shape the
constitutional law in that city, as judges will use these early technological
choices to shape a digital positive law responsive to Fourth Amendment
principles and values.

